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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, there have been substantial interests in the joint production of ethanol 
and distillers grains (E&DG) from corn. At the same time, there have been corresponding 
increases in the production of animal feed based on distillers grains (DG). Under such 
circumstances, ethanol and DG are produced by an E&DG producer, and DG serves as input 
to feed production by a feed producer.The objective of this paper is to study the strategies of 
both producers in different models in order to maximize their own profit with more ethanol 
produced by consuming more DG in the feed market.  
First, we investigate the economic relationships such as pricing between the E&DG 
producer and the DG-based feed (feed) producer under Stackelberg competition as well as 
under coordination when both producers have their own linear production costs, respectively. 
(1) Specifically, for competition, we construct a Stackelberg model with an E&DG producer 
as the leader and a feed producer as the follower, and examine the consequences in terms of 
profits, prices, and production and purchase quantities. As the DG fraction increases, the 
E&DG producer loses or gains more profit than the feed producer under different conditions. 
Under specific condition, as the DG fraction increases, both producers have higher profit 
with the higher quantity of DG as well as ethanol so as to help the increasing ethanol market. 
(2) For coordination, we consider a centrally coordinated model where producers are viewed 
as one group. Compared with the Stackelberg model, the centrally coordinated model has 
higher total profit to be shared by both producers as they are optimizing the total profit as a 
single company with more DG as well as ethanol produced.  
ix 
 
Second, this paper extends Stackelberg model with a quadratic unit joint production cost 
for the E&DG producer. For this model, we investigate the economic relationships such as 
pricing, profit for both producers and compared with the euqilibrium solution in the 
Stackelberg model with a linear joint production cost for the E&DG producer. 
 
Key Words: Game theory; Supply chain; Ethanol; Distillers grains; DG-based feed 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the renewable energy consumption in the U.S.A. grows, ethanol, a renewable source 
of energy as supplement for gasoline, is increasing by the stimulation. Nowadays, ethanol is 
the only renewable motor fuel produced in large quantity, i.e., the United States produced 3.9 
billion gallons of ethanol in 2005, up from 3.4 billion gallons in 2004. In addition, most 
ethanol is produced from corn. For instance, approximately 97% of ethanol in the U.S.A. is 
produced from corn. The corn-based ethanol industry is poised to significantly contribute to 
meet rising energy demands in the coming years.  
1.1 Introduction to the corn-ethanol industry 
 In 2006, there were 102 ethanol bio-refineries with another 42 under construction, up 
from 50 ethanol plants in 1999. Iowa and other states in Midwest America form the 
traditional corn zone and this area is quickly becoming the major area for corn-ethanol 
production. Dry mill processing of corn results in two products—ethanol and distillers grains 
(DG). Approximately 1/3 ton of each of the constituent products are produced from 1 ton of 
corn processed [1]. As a renewable energy source, ethanol is becoming more available for 
automobiles around the United States.  
The ethanol industry has changed the shape and structure of the corn industry in recent 
years. More policies from the federal and some states are keeping stimulating the ethanol 
industry to expand. The implementation of the Clean Air Act in 1990 helped propel 
renewable energy. In several states, there is a 10% ethanol mandate, e.g., all gasoline sold in 
the state of Minnesota (1997), Hawaii (2006), Montana (2006), Missouri (2008), and 
Washington (2009) must contain at least 10% ethanol. In addition, the EPAct has several 
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important incentive provisions. The most widely publicized provision of the EPAct, the 
Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), applies to corn ethanol. Implementation of the RFS began 
in 2006 with 4 billion gallons per year, and is predicted to increase to 7.5 billion gallons per 
year by 2012 [2]. Currently, the subsidy policy to the bio-fuel, mixing ethanol with gasoline, 
is volumetric ethanol excise tax credit (VEETC).  
The incentives from the states play an important role for the expansion of the local 
ethanol industry. For example, Minnesota has an incentive program of 20 cents per gallon on 
up to 15 million gallon of ethanol per year for maximum of 10 year; and Wisconsin has the 
similar policy of ethanol production incentive to corn-ethanol producers with 20 cents per 
gallon produced.  
As we know, several outputs that emerged from a single productive activity are the 
fundamental economic situation. More and more DG are produced as the expansion of the 
corn-ethanol industry, since it is one of the joint products in corn-ethanol production. 
Generally, DG is sold to the feed producer or local livestock producer as a protein source for 
beef, swine, cattle, poultry, and so on [3], e.g., Land O‟Lakes Purina Feed LLC purchases 
DG for their feed manufacturing [4].  
Hawkeye Energy holding LLC, an important corn-ethanol producer in the state of Iowa, 
sells DG to local livestock producers and interacts with feed companies on a daily basis 
around each of its ethanol plants. Behnke [5] mentions that the volume available and the 
relative price of DG have forced many feed producers to using greater levels than before. “In 
the past, the ethanol producers wanted to „make the mash go away‟ and livestock producers 
said they would use it only because it is free. Today, ethanol producers see it as a viable and 
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valuable co-product and livestock producers determine how to best utilize it in their 
ingredient feed mix” [6].  
From a survey, DG is shipped to local (51%), state (33%) , export (14%) as the 
ingredient in the feed, and other (2%) as the industrial use. DG is used in livestock rations as 
the protein supplement [7], and less than 30 to 40% of the ration dry material (DM) as DG 
can be fed to some dairy cattle or around 40 to 50% can be included in the diets of finishing 
cattle. When feeding more than 20% DG, the livestock producer is likely to feed excess 
protein. To counter this, forages consisting mostly of corn silage and excess phosphorus are a 
consideration [8],[9].  
Some researches show that the U.S. livestock feed demand for DG can accommodate the 
rapid growth in DG production. Also according to the responses from 10 ethanol producers, 
i.e. ADM, Hawkeye, ACE, etc., all DG is sold out without surplus nowadays. In 2008, 23M 
tons of DG was produced in U.S.A. From the record in Oct. 22, 2009, the capacity of ethanol 
in USA is 13131.4 million gallon per year (39.8M tons per year). Therefore, the capacity of 
DG is almost 39.8M tons/year by following the 1:1 fixed proportional rate between ethanol 
and DG.  
However, with the rapid expansion of the ethanol industry, the production of DG as 
byproduct also keeps the rapid growth. According to the Energy Independent and Security 
Act of 2007, the renewable fuels standard (FRS) requires 36billion gallons of ethanol=109M 
tons in 2022. So, the capacity of DG will be at least 109M tons/year. Although the feedlot 
farmer can consume more DG with the higher inclusion rate in the feed, and there exists the 
potential growth export market, it will be a big problem in the next decade that the supply of 
DG from the ethanol producers is becoming greater than the demand from the feed producers. 
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All ethanol producers have to face the problem how to deal with the excess distillers grains. 
Therefore, it is important to propose some strategies for the corn-ethanol supply chain to 
overcome the potential challenge in the next several years. 
Based on the industry, what this paper depicts is a two-producer vertical channel. An 
upstream producer produces two outputs from the same process, and a downstream producer 
utilizes only one of the two outputs as intermediate material in her own production. In this 
paper, the upstream producer is the producer of ethanol and DG (the E&DG producer), who 
produces ethanol and DG from corn, and then sells ethanol to the ethanol-based fuel market, 
e.g., ADM (Archer Daniels Midland). AMD has sales from the bio-products segment of 
about $3.59 billion in 2008, up from $3.06 billion in 2007. The downstream producer is the 
DG-based feed producer (the feed producer), who purchases DG as the ingredient for feed 
production, e.g., Land O‟Lakes, who has the sales from the feed segment of about $3.9 
billion in 2008, up from $3.1 billion in 2007.  
The price the E&DG producer sets and the quantity of ethanol this producer produces do 
not have any effect on the market price. Each is small, relative to the ethanol market. 
Therefore, the E&DG producer does not need to worry about what price to set for ethanol. 
Instead, E&DG producer is concerned with only how much to produce [10]. Nowadays, in 
the U.S.A. ethanol market, there are more than 100 ethanol producers, and none has a 
dominant market power in the ethanol market [7],[11],[12]. Bole and Londo [13] mentioned 
the bio-fuel industry is mostly a price-taker, because the price of ethanol is not promptly 
followed by an increase in the feedstock price. 
In recent years, expansion of the ethanol industry has attracted substantial research 
attention. The production quantities of ethanol, DG, and DG-based feed also increase. 
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However, corn is main ingredient in feed, and its price is a fluctuant factor. Under such 
circumstances, we investigate the impact from the change in the DG fraction on the ethanol 
market when the other ingredients' cost increases as the corn price increases. The objective is 
to find under some specific conditions, the increase of the DG fraction can increase the 
amount of DG as well as ethanol for helping the expanding ethanol market when the other 
ingredients' cost increases. In addition, we investigate the competitive and the coordinated 
relationship for the E&DG producers and the DG-based feed producers. The objective of this 
paper is to gain insight from the competition and coordination between these two producers 
with the joint production, which one is helpful to the quick expanding ethanol market, and 
how both producers can be better off. Since the rapid growth of DG is caused by the 
expanding corn ethanol industry, how the huge amount of DG can be solved by the 
comparison between the competition and coordination.  
Most of the studies focus on the measurement of the market structure and power for a 
single product, and ignore the joint products in a vertical structure supply chain. 
Alternatively, the joint production cost is allocated to determine the price for each output. In 
this paper, two producers in the game competition are—one is operating the joint production 
without cost allocation for the price making, the other is operating processing production. 
The producer operating the joint production is the price-taker for one product and the price-
maker for another product.  
Motivated by this, we address the following questions in this paper: What is the 
equilibrium solution for the joint production? What is the condition under which the increase 
of the DG fraction can increase the amount of DG as well as ethanol and the profit of both 
producers? What is the economical impact under the Stackelberg model after comparing with 
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the centrally coordinated (CC) model? In such a case, what is the supply chain contract for 
pursuing channel coordination? Moreover, what is the impact from the price of one product 
given by the market? 
1.2 Literature Review 
Mathematical methodology provides relative techniques for economic analysis. In the 
vertical structure with joint products, the tasks are to solve the equilibrium solution, to 
determine the optimal solution in the centrally coordination, and to establish the contract for 
the coordination. Consequently, we reviewed papers related to game theoretical models of 
successive monopolists‟ supply chain.  
Relative to the big ethanol market, the E&DG producer is small and is concerned with 
only how much to produce [7], i.e., in the U.S.A., all ethanol producers have not a dominant 
market power in the ethanol market [5]. 
As for the game with the joint production, Elishberg and Steinberg [14],[15] modeled 
joint production-marketing strategies for two firms with asymmetric production cost 
structures in Stackelberg competition, where the producer is the leader and the distributor is 
the follower. Baumgartner [16] established a similar configuration as our paper, by exploring 
the price ambivalence of secondary resources on a vertically integrated two-sector economy.  
As Cheng and Liao [17] mentioned, many producers involved with chemical, petroleum 
production, and meat packing production use the cost-plus pricing approach to determine the 
selling price for products. In this situation, joint costs are allocated before the determination 
of the joint product cost-plus price. In this paper, however, the cost allocation is not 
implemented into the model. 
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Tirole [18] investigated the concept of vertical supply chain with double marginalization 
in the industrial organization. Double marginalization refers to the loss of profits and higher 
retail price in a decentralized supply chain because of two successive mark-ups. Double 
marginalization occurs because the retailer does not consider the producer‟s profit while 
setting the retail price. Weyl [19] described the Spengler-Stackelberg industrial organization. 
There is a common additional assumption that upstream chooses its prices before 
downstream in the spirit of von Stackelberg. Jeuland and Shugan [20] and Irmen [21] studied 
the absolute output margin as the decision variables under the Cournot scenario. Jeuland and 
Shugan [20] investigated the double marginalization in several scenarios under general 
conditions. They showed that a channel of distribution consists of different channel members, 
each having their own decision variables. 
In addition, Young [22] studied that two firms make pricing decisions simultaneously by 
their own output margin to reach a Nash Equilibrium. Lee and Staelin [23] investigated 
different supply chain structures and power scenarios in two echelon supply chains such as 
the producer-leader and retailer-leader, etc. They found the type of vertical strategic 
interaction (VSI), as defined by the slope of the followers‟ response function, is the driving 
force behind equilibrium decisions on supply chain leadership and pricing.  In addition, they 
demonstrated the linear demand function is not a necessary condition for any type of VSI and 
suggested the linear-nonlinear dichotomy is not important for robustness of the analytical 
results. Lau and Lau [24] compared different possible gaming processes in two-echelon 
vertical supply chain consisting of a producer and a retailer. They discussed the producer 
being the leader, the retailer being a leader by declaring a dollar output margin, and the 
retailer being the leader by declaring a percentage margin. 
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Yang and Zhou [25] considered pricing and quantity decisions of a two-echelon system 
with a producer who supplies a single product to two competitive retailers. They analyzed the 
effects of the duopolistic retailers‟ different competitive behavior: Cournot, Collusion and 
Stackelberg. The comparison of the equilibrium solutions for these three two-echelon models 
is made. Choi [26] studied three non-cooperative games of different power structures 
between the two producers and the retailer, i.e., two Stackelberg games between each of the 
producers and the retailer, and one Nash game.  
Bard et al. [27] and Rozakis et al. [28] studied the Stackelberg model in which the 
government has the leadership in the corn-ethanol production.Tyrchniewicz [29] figured out 
that the supply chain leadership in the corn-ethanol industry usually is holdby the E&DG 
producer. 
Compared to the competition, Jeuland and Shugan [20] explored the problems inherent 
in channel coordination, and addressed some questions. The structure of the simple model is 
directly usable to analyze the case of a franchise in which a producer sells locally one 
product through one retailer. Savaskan and Bhattacharya, etc. [30] also presented the case 
with the centrally coordinated system as the benchmark scenario to compare the 
decentralized models with respect to the supply chain profits and the performance. 
Frohlich [31] pointed out, in practice, an integration of several producers is difficult to 
achieve, in spite of knowing the theoretical benefits of supply chain integration for years. In 
the real world, the E&DG producer and the feed producer are separate from their own 
business. 
Cachon and Lariviere [32] studied the supply chain coordination with a revenue sharing 
contract. This type of contract is prevalent in the videocassette rental industry relative to the 
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price contract. Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo [33] proposed a coordinated model with three-
stage supply chain, based on the revenue sharing contract. So far, different contract models 
have been developed, including the revenue sharing contract, the quantity discount contract, 
the incentive mechanism, etc. Zhao and Wang [34] made a profit improvement by extending 
the Stackelberg model with a proper contract design. Yu et al. [35] pointed out that the 
Stackelberg equilibrium can be improved to further benefit the producer and its retailers if 
the retailers are willing to cooperate with the producer by using a cooperative contract. In this 
paper, a particular revenue sharing contract is utilized by the players in the Stackelberg game 
for gaining a higher profit by channel coordination. 
For the game theory with constraints, Breton and Zaccour [36] studied that the 
Stackelberg game with a security constraint for the follower and presented the equilibrium 
solution under the specific condition characterized by parameters. Shantha Daniel [37] solved 
that the Stackelberg model for the electricity firms in a successive structure with some 
constraints. Baumgartner and Jost [38] and Baumgartner [16] obtained the equilibrium 
solution by taking into account the joint production problems, where a constraint about the 
disposal of the excess of secondary resource is considered. Breton, etc. [39] studied several 
game theoretical models in environmental projects.  
In this paper, mathematical programming models are built for two outputs (i.e., ethanol 
and DG) which necessarily emerge from a single activity of processing corn. So, the 
organization of for the Stackelberg model without constraint is described as follows. Chapter 
2 sets up the model environment, including the definition and notation for the models, and 
states the assumption conditions; establishes the E&DG producer-driven Stackelberg model 
with the linear unit joint production cost; obtains the equilibrium solution in the ED model; 
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and makes the robust analysis to selected parameters in the Stackelberg model. In chapter 3, 
the centrally coordinated model (CC) on the vertical structure supply chain is extended and 
proposed as a benchmark so asfor a comparison with the Stackelberg model. In chapter 4, the 
E&DG producer-driven Stackelberg model with a quadratic unit joint production cost (EDQ) 
is developed, and then the comparison between the ED model and the EDQ model is 
executed. In chapter 5, the numerical applications for all models arepresent, with two 
numerical comparisons: 1) one is between the ED model and the CC model, and 2) one is 
between the ED model and the EDQ model. Chapter 6 concludes our findings and suggests 
future research. 
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2. THE E&DG PRODUCER-DRIVEN (ED) STACKELBERG 
MODEL 
2.1 Model environment 
The following model with an E&DG producer as well as a feed producer is inspired by 
the example of ethanol and DG from corn. Both ethanol and DG emerge from a single joint 
production activity of the E&DG producer. Ethanol is sold to various customers in the 
ethanol market at a certain price, such as BP, Conoco-Phillips, etc.. DG is sold to various 
feed producers with a certain price, e.g., Land O‟Lakes, whom in turn, sells feed to 
customers in the feed market with a certain price, such as local feedlot. In this paper, we 
model this economical relationship between a single representative E&DG producer and a 
single representative feed producer as depicted in Figure 2.1. The E&DG producer is denoted 
as “he” and the feed producer is denoted as “she” where applicable throughout this paper. 
The producer of 
ethanol and DG
The DG-based feed 
producer
Customers of
 DG-based feed
Customers of 
ethanol
dfp
dpep
 
Figure 2.1 Configuration of the ED model with one E&DG producer and one feed producer 
So far as we know, ethanol and DG are produced from corn in the production of the 
E&DG producer. Then, DG serves as input for the process of feed production. Feed consist 
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of other ingredients and DG and is produced by the feed producer. In summary for 
transactions in the supply chain, the E&DG producer sells ethanol to customers of ethanol 
such as the ethanol-based fuel producer, and at the same time sells DG to the feed producer; 
the feed producer in turn sells feed to customers of DG-based feed in the feed market.  
2.1.1 Definitions 
On this subsection, we first present the following list of notations. 
Parameters 
ek  the proportion of ethanol produced from one unit of corn 
dk  the proportion of DG produced from one unit of corn 
emc  the joint production cost of processing one ton of corn ( $/ton ) 
cc  
the corn price ( $/ton ) 
fmc  the processing cost to obtain one ton of feed ( $/ton ) 
fc  the cost of per ton of other ingredients in the feed production ( $/ton ) 
f  the fraction of DG in DG-based feed (the DG fraction) 
ep  the price of ethanol ( $/ton ) 
df   the maximum price of DG-based feed 
df   the price sensitivity to demand of feed 
ddc  
the drying cost of obtaining one ton of DG ( $/ton )  
  
Decision variables for models  
dp  the price of DG ( $/ton ) 
dfp  the price of DG-based feed ( $/ton )  
  
Dependent variables and other economic variables 
dfD  ( ) /df df df dfD p   , the quantity of DG-based feed ( ton ) 
dD  the demand quantity of DG ( ton ) 
Q  the quantity of corn used for the E&DG production ( ton ) 
dQ  the quantity of DG produced from the E&DG production ( ton ) 
eQ  the quantity of ethanol produced from the E&DG production ( ton ) 
eD  the demand quantity of ethanol ( ton ) 
E  the E&DG producer‟s profit ( $ ) 
F  the feed producer‟s profit ( $ ) 
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CC  the total profit of the whole supply chain ( $ ) 
eR  the revenue from selling ethanol ( $ ) 
dR  the revenue from selling DG ( $ ) 
dfR  the revenue from selling DG-based feed ( $ ) 
As for expenses, emc  is the cost to produce ek tons of ethanol and dk tons of DG from 
one ton of corn; cc is the corn price per ton; fm
c
 
is the processing cost when producing one 
ton of feed; and 
fc is the cost of other ingredients (e.g., forage, alfalfa, corn, etc.). Thus, 
 1f fc  is the cost of other ingredients in order for producing one ton of feed which 
contains
f tons of DG.  
ep  is the price of ethanol sold by the E&DG producer to the ethanol market. dp  is the 
price of DG  sold from the E&DG producer to the feed producer. 
dfp is the price of DG-
based feed sold by the feed producer to customers in the feed market. In this paper, ,d dfp p  
are decision variables in the competition environment, and
dfp is the decision variable in the 
coordinated environment. 
For simplicity, we utilize “ton” to describe the measure unit of all relevant products 
(including corn, ethanol, DG, other ingredients, and feed), and use the conversion: 1 ton = 
330 gallon to convert ethanol price, typically represented by $/gallon to $/ton; 1ton = 39.36 
bushel to convert corn price, typically represented by $/bushel to $/ton [40].  
2.1.2 Assumptions 
A1. The demand function of feed is assumed as   /df df df dfD p   , which is widely 
utilized in some supply chain literature [27],[32],[33].
 
Thereby, the demand of feed dfD is a 
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decreasing linear function with respect to
dfp . 0df  is the maximum feed price which is 
greater than the optimal feed price
dfp , and 0df  is the price sensitivity to the demand of 
feed. We assume the quantity of ethanol, DG and feed is positive, the price of DG as well as 
feed is positive. The quantity of feed is  0, /df df dfD   , and the feed price is  0,df dfp  .  
The quantity of feed
dfD is assumed to be positive, because the supply chain in Figure 2.1 
does not exist if the quantity of feed is less than or equal to zero; the quantity of feed
dfD is 
assumed to be less than /df df  , because the DG price will be non-positive if dfD is greater 
than or equal to /df df  . When the DG price is negative, the E&DG producer will discard 
DG freely in order to avoid the lose in selling DG, and when the DG price is zero, the E&DG 
producer will not like to cost in drying DG for nothing revenue from selling DG.  
A2. ek  
and dk are the fixed proportions, where , 0e dk k  are constant values.  
Processing corn into ethanol and DG requires fixed proportions of ethanol ( ek ) and DG 
( dk ) per unit of corn processed [7]. In addition, we assume DG is dried to 0% moisture, 
although most E&DG producers produced dry DG to about 10% moisture. 
A3. The customers in the ethanol market and the DG-based feed market respectively 
consume all produced ethanol and feed. In addition, all produced DG is sold to the feed 
producer as the raw material in the DG-based feed production and the feed producer 
purchases DG only from the E&DG producer. 
The quantity of DG sold to the feed producer is determined by the demand of feed and 
the DG fraction,
 d df f
D D  . The E&DG producer exactly satisfies the demand of DG from 
the feed producer,
 d d df f
Q D D   . The produced amount of ethanol is equal to the demand 
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of ethanol from the ethanol market, e eQ D .  As shown in the assumption A2, e
k ton of 
ethanol and dk ton of DG from are produced from one ton of corn. Given f , producing one 
ton of feed requires
f ton of DG; f ton of DG are produced from /f dk ton of corn; and
/f dk ton of corn produce /e f dk k ton of ethanol.  
So, given
dfD , the quantity of dried DG, the quantity of corn, and the quantity of ethanol 
are presented by the following: 
1) Eq. (2.1), the quantity of dried DG produced by the E&DG producer is 
 
d d df fQ D D   .  (2.1) 
2) Eq. (2.2), the quantity of corn used for the production is 
 / / /d d d d df f dQ Q k D k D k   .  (2.2) 
3) Eq. (2.3), the quantity of ethanol produced from the E&DG producer is 
 / / /e e e e d d e d d e df f dD Q k Q k Q k k D k k D k     .  (2.3) 
A4. 0 1f  , the DG fraction is greater than zero and less than one. The customers in the 
feed market make no distinction to feed with the different DG fraction. 
It is the nonexistence of the supply chain as shwon in Figure 2.1 since the feed producer 
does not purchase any DG while 0f  . And it is unrealistic to feed animals with 100% DG, 
1f   
[11]. The customer in the feed market makes no distinction to feed with different DG 
fraction since feed is assumed to have the same quality with different DG fraction. 
A5. The E&DG producer is considered as a price-taker on ethanol as mentioned in the 
introduction [7],[11]. However, the E&DG producer is the price-maker on DG in this two-
player vertical supply chain structure. 
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The price the E&DG producer sets and the quantity of ethanol this producer produces do 
not have any effect on the market price. Therefore, the E&DG producer does not need to 
worry about what price to set for ethanol. Instead, E&DG producer is concerned with only 
how much to produce [16], since an E&DG producer is small when compared to the ethanol 
market, i.e., all ethanol producers in American have no dominant market power in the ethanol 
market [8]. However, the E&DG producer can control the selling price of DG to the feed 
produce, since most feed producers are small when comparing to the E&DG producer and set 
up their facility around the E&DG producer for avoiding more cost in transportation.  
A6. There are no fixed costs for the ethanol and DG production and the DG-based feed 
production respectively for both producers, since the issue related to investment is not 
explored. 
A7. Each producer has positive profit. And, it is a static single period strategy for producers.  
Here we use Eq. (2.4) to denote the gain of the feed producer from one ton of feed and 
Eq.(2.5) to denote the gain of the E&DG producer from one ton of DG, where both unit 
profits are positive since both producers need get benefit from this supply chain. 
  1df f f fm d fp c c p       (2.4) 
 
   /e e d d em c dd d dp k p k c c c k k      (2.5) 
1) The E&DG producer 
We re-arrange the gain of the E&DG producer from one ton of DG to one ton of corn, 
   d d em c dd d e ep k c c c k p k    .  (2.6) 
From the assumption A5, the E&DG producer is the price taker on ethanol and the price 
maker on DG. He has the difference in Eq. (2.7) between the sum of all costs for processing 
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one ton of corn (including the joint production cost, the corn price, and drying cost for DG) 
and the revenue from selling the ethanol produced from one ton of corn, 
 em c dd d e ec c c k k p   , that is the benefit from one ton of corn excluding the revenue from 
DG, 
  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    .  (2.7) 
a) 0 , the revenue from selling ethanol totally covers all cost in producing ethanol 
and DG from one ton of corn. Even though the DG price is small, the E&DG 
producer always has profit through selling ethanol in the ethanol market.  
b) 0  , the revenue from selling ethanol is less than all cost in producing ethanol and 
DG from one ton of corn. The E&DG producer is small enough so that he can‟t cover 
all costs by selling ethanol and should have enough revenue through selling DG so as 
to cover the remaining cost. 
2) The feed producer 
The gain of the feed producer from one ton of feed in Eq. (2.4) is positive, that is, 
 1 0df f f fm d fp c c p      . According to the assumption A1, DG price is positive. 
Hence, from the assumption A7, the feed producer has the positive difference in Eq. (2.8) to 
show the benefit expressed in term of one ton of feed excluding the cost from DG, 
  0 1df f f fmp c c    .  (2.8) 
Moreover, since df is the maximum feed price, the term  1df f f fmc c     that is the 
difference between the maximum feed price and the sum of the processing cost and the cost 
from other ingredients for producing one ton of feed should be satisfied by Eq. (2.9). 
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  0 1df f f fmc c       (2.9) 
where  1f fc  is the other ingredients' cost for one ton of feed, fmc  is the processing cost 
for one ton of feed and
df is the maximum price per ton of feed. 
For any , (0,1)f f   , there is Eq. (2.10) derived from for the assumptions A1 and A7, 
 0 df f fmc c   .
  (2.10) 
Based on the configuration and assumptions, the next section will study the equilibrium 
in the Stackelberg model, where the E&DG producer has leadership over the feed producer.  
2.1.3 Scope 
1) In this configuration, there are no other usages of corn except for as the raw material in 
the corn-ethanol&DG production and the possible component of other ingredients in the 
feed production.  
2) Corn and DG are not sold directly to the cumstomers in the feed market. So, there is no 
competitive substitution relationship among corn, DG, and DG-based feed in the feed 
market to feed animal. And there is no competitive substitution relationship between corn 
for the corn-ethanol&DG production and corn as the component of other ingredients for 
the feed production.  
3) Ethanol in the ethanol market and DG for the feed production is produced only from 
corn. Other ingredients (e.g., forage, alfalfa, corn, etc.) can be assumed as one raw 
material for the feed production. 
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2.2 The E&DG Producer-Driven Stackelberg model (ED)  
In this section, a detailed formulation and analysis of a Stackelberg model are presented 
for the E&DG producer and the feed producer, where the former is the Stackelberg leader 
and the latter is the Stackelberg follower. The Stackelberg model is a strategic game where 
the leader moves first and the follower moves sequentially, after observing the leader‟s 
decision. In turn, the leader knows the follower will make her own decision, after observing 
the leader‟s decision [41]. This model is designated as “ED.”  
As for  the feed transaction, the feed producer charges the price
dfp  per unit of feed and 
receives payment
df dfp D  from customers in the feed market. For the DG transaction, the 
E&DG producer only charges dp per unit of DG and receives payment d df fp D   from the feed 
producer according to Eq.(2.1). For the ethanol transaction, the E&DG producer charges ep  
per unit of ethanol and receives payment /e e e e df f dp D p k D k from customers in the ethanol 
market according to Eq.(2.3). 
2.2.1 Profit maximum problems and the equilibrium solution 
In the ED model, the equilibrium solution is characterized via backward induction by 
first characterizing the response function of the feed producer. Then, this is followed by the 
solution to the E&DG producer‟s profit problem. 
1) The feed producer 
From the assumption A3  the feed producer only purchases DG from the E&DG 
producer and then sells all DG-based feed to customers in the feed market. The profit 
problem of the feed producer is shown in Eq.(2.11), 
  F df d d f df d fm dfR p D c D D c D      .  (2.11) 
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The profit for the feed producer,
 F
 , is given by the difference between the revenue of 
selling feed and all relevant costs. The first term
dfR  is the revenue from selling feed and 
equals to
df dfp D ; the second term d dp D  is the cost of purchasing DG from the E&DG 
producer; the third term  f df dc D D  is the cost of purchasing other ingredients; and the last 
term
fm dfc D  
is the processing cost for the feed production. 
From the assumption A1 and Eqs. (2.1),(2.2),(2.3) and (2.11), the feed producer 
maximized her profit function in Eq.(2.12), where she decides the price of feed
dfp and 
assumes the price of DG dp given. 
 
 
  
Max    1
1
df
F df df d df f f f df fm df
p
df df
df d f f f fm
df
p D p D c D c D
p
p p c c
 

 

     

    
  (2.12) 
Given dp , the concavity of the profit function of the feed producer F  
in the price of 
feed
dfp is guaranteed by the second-order sufficient condition, 
 2 2/ 2 / 0F df dfp       .  (2.13) 
The first-order necessary condition of Eq. (2.12) with respect to the price of feed
dfp is 
the equilibrium condition of the feed producer, as shown in Eq. (2.14), 
 
 1 2
0
df f f fm f d dfF
df df
c c p p
p
  

    
 

.  (2.14) 
Moreover, Eq. (2.14) is rearranged to the explicit form of the unique best response 
function of the feed producer for the given DG price dp , shown as follows, 
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 1
ˆ ˆ:         
2 2
df f f fm f
df d df d d
c c
p (p ) p (p ) p
    
 
.
  (2.15) 
So far, the E&DG producer can decide the optimal price for DG dp after knowing about 
the best response function of the feed producer ˆ ( )df dp p in Eq. (2.15). 
2) The E&DG producer 
As for the E&DG producer, he sells DG to the feed producer and ethanol to customers in 
the ethanol market, and generates the costs in corn, the joint production, and the drying 
process of DG. Then, the E&DG producer‟s profit problem is shown in Eq. (2.16), 
 E d e em c dd dR R c Q c Q c D        (2.16) 
The profit of the E&DG producer,
 E
 , is given by the difference between the revenues 
of selling DG and ethanol, on the one hand, and the cost of the E&DG production, on the 
other hand. The first term dR  is the revenue from selling DG and equals to d dp D ; the second 
term eR  is the sum of the revenue from selling ethanol and equals to e ep D ; the third term emc Q
is the joint production cost for the E&DG producer to process Q  tons of corn; the fourth term
cc Q  is the cost of corn; and the final term dd dc D  is the drying cost of obtaining d dD k Q  
tons of DG. 
From the assumption A1 and Eqs. (2.1), (2.2), (2.3)and (2.16), the E&DG producer 
maximizes his own profit function in Eq. (2.17), where he decides the price of DG dp , and 
has known the best response function ˆ ( )df dp p which is the function of dp  in Eq. (2.15). 
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 
Max   
ˆ
d
e df f df f df f
E e d df f em c dd df f
p
d d d
df df dem c dd de
e d f
d d df
k D D D
p p D c c c D
k k k
p (p )c c c kk
p p
k k
  
 



     
  
   
 
  (2.17) 
After substituting the best response function ˆ ( )df dp p in Eq. (2.15) into Eq. (2.17), the 
concavity of the profit function of the E&DG producer in the price of DG dp is guaranteed by 
the second-order sufficient condition in Eq. (2.18): 
 2 2 2/ / 0E d f dfp        .
  (2.18) 
Hence, Eq. (2.19), the first-order necessary condition of Eq. (2.17) in dp , is the 
equilibrium condition of the E&DG producer, 
 
    21 2
0
2
df f f fm d f f d f d
E
d df d
c c k k p
p k
    

    
 

.
  (2.19) 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    . In Eq. (2.19) , the term  1df f f fmc c    should be 
nonnegative since from the assumptions A7 and A1. In summary, the equilibrium conditions 
consist of Eqs. (2.14) and (2.19). Therefore, after solving the equilibrium conditions, the 
equilibrium DG price in the ED model is shown in Eq. (2.20), where the superscript ed
denotes the ED model and * is the designation of optimality. 
 
  
*
1
2
df f f fm d fed
d
d f
c c k
p
k
  

   
   (2.20) 
The DG price *ed
dp in Eq. (2.20) is assumed as positive since otherwise the E&DG 
producer would have nothing revenue from selling DG with a negative DG price from the 
assumption A1. Thus, 
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   1df f f fm d fc c k        .  (2.21) 
After substituting the equilibrium DG price into the best response function in Eq. (2.15), 
the equilibrium feed price is, 
 
  
*
3 1
4
df f f fm d fed
df
d
c c k
p
k
     

.
  (2.22) 
As we know from the assumption A1, the feed price *ed
dfp  should be positive. Eq. (2.23) 
is positive due to   1df f f fm d fc c k        in Eq. (2.21). Then the feed price in Eq. 
(2.22) should be positive accoridng to Eq. (2.21). 
   3 1 2 0df f f fm d f dfc c k           (2.23) 
where
df is positive. 
Table 2.1 shows the equilibrium solution corresponding to the quantities and the profits 
in the supply chain. 
Table 2.1 The equilibrium solution of the ED model 
*ed
dfD
 
  1
4
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
*ed
dD    1
4
df f f fm d f
f
d df
c c k
k
  


   
 
*edQ    
2
1
4
df f f fm d f
f
d df
c c k
k
  


   
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*ed
eD    
2
1
4
df f f fm d f
e f
d df
c c k
k
k
  


   
 
*ed
dfp
 
   4 1
4
df df f f fm d f
d
c c k
k
       
 
*ed
dp    1
2
df f f fm d f
d f
c c k
k
  

   
 
*ed
E
 
   
2
2
1
8
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
*ed
F
 
   
2
2
1
16
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as in Eq. (2.7). 
 
  
*
1
4
df f f fm d fed
df
d df
c c k
D
k
  

   

.
  (2.24) 
*ed
dfD  in Eq. (2.24) is ranged in  0, /df df dfD    from the assumption A1. Therefore, 
the optimal feed quantity is greater than zero. 
 
  
*
1
0
4
df f f fm d fed
df
d df
c c k
D
k
  

   
 
.
  (2.25) 
Then, Eq. (2.25) is rearranged as Eq. (2.26), 
   1f df f f fm dc c k       .  (2.26) 
In addition, the optimal feed quantity is less than /df df  from the assumption A1. That 
is,  
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  
*
1
/
4
df f f fm d fed
df df df
d df
c c k
D
k
  
 

   
    (2.27) 
Moreover, Eq. (2.27) is rearranged  
   3 1df f f fm d fc c k        .  (2.28) 
Eq. (2.27) is satisfied according to Eq. (2.23) if   1df f f fm d fc c k        in Eq. 
(2.21) is true. 
In sum, it should be observed from Eq. (2.21) for and Eq. (2.26) that the following 
condition in Eq. (2.29) for the positive DG price *ed
dp  and the positive quantity of feed
*ed
dfD
from the assumption A1. 
      1 1df f f fm d f df f f fm dc c k c c k              ,  (2.29) 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    as in Eq. (2.7). 
Eq. (2.29) is rearranged to be Eq. (2.30) for the positive DG fraction
f ,  
 
   df f fm d df f fm d
f d f d
f f
c c k c c k
c k c k
 
 
    
     .  (2.30) 
Eq. (2.30) is hold under the condition Eq. (2.31) for any , (0,1)f f   in the assumption 
A4, 
    df fm d df fm dc k c k      ,  (2.31) 
where 0df fmc   according to the assumptions A1 andA7.  
The proof for Eq. (2.31) is shown in the following: 
In Eq. (2.30), for any , (0,1)f f   ,  
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a) the term   /df f fm d f f dc c k c k     has the minimum value
 df f fm d f dc c k c k    when 1f  , thus  df f fm d f dc c k c k    , that is, 
 df fm dc k  ; 
b) the term   /df f fm d f f dc c k c k      has the maximum value 
 df f fm d f dc c k c k    when 1f  , thus  df f fm d f dc c k c k      , that 
is,
  df fm dc k    . 
So, for and any , (0,1)f f    Eq. (2.31) should be satisfied. Q.E.D. 
From Table 2.1, we note that 
 * *2ed edE F   .  (2.32) 
That is, the profit of the E&DG producer is twice as much as that of the feed producer at 
the equilibrium point, since the E&DG producer has the first-move advantage as the 
leadership to know the best response function from the feed producer and set up a DG price 
which can be accepted by the feed producer in the supply chain.  
Eq. (2.32) is satisfied, under the conditions as below,  
1) The assumption A3 shows that d dk Q D , all DG produced by the E&DG 
producer is consumed by the feed producer for the animal feed production; 
2) the E&DG producer is using a linear pricing policy for DG; 
3) and the feed producer is facing a linear demand function of feed;  
4) both producers have the linear production cost. 
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The feed producer has the best response in feed price in Eq. (2.15) with regard to the DG 
price. Therefore, for any dp given by the E&DG producer, there exists the corresponding feed 
price. Then, substituting Eq. (2.15) into the profit problem of the feed producer in Eq. (2.12) 
as well as the E&DG producer in Eq. (2.17), we have * *2ed edE F    at the equilibrium point
     * 1 / 2edd df f f fm d f d fp c c k k        . 
At the equilibrium point, the feed producer's gain in terms of feed is shown in Eq. (2.33). 
 
 
     
* *1
1 / 4
ed ed
df f f fm d
df f f fm d f d
p c c p
c c k k

  
   
    
  (2.33) 
According to Eq. (1),
 d df f
D D  . Hence, from Eq. (2.5), the E&DG producer's gain in 
terms of feed is shown in Eq. (2.34).  
 
  
     
* / /
1 / 2
ed
d em c dd d d e e d f
df f f fm f d
p c c c k k p k k
c c k

  
   
    
  (2.34) 
From Eqs. (2.33) and (2.34), the E&DG producer obtains twice as much profit from one 
ton of DG as the feed producer.  
2.3 Analysis of the other ingredients' cost
fc and the DG fraction f  
In the U.S.A., the optimal DG fraction often is studied for the animal feeding 
performance. Also, the feed producer is coming up against the problem that sales would not 
cover higher production costs [42],[43],[44], because of the higher other ingredients' cost (i.e., 
corn, alfalfa). However, the increase of the DG fraction reduces the higher production cost to 
replace part of corn in feed when the DG price (corn basis) is lower than the corn price. 
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Based on this reason, the impact from the other ingredients' cost
fc and the DG fraction f on 
the supply chain is worth to be explored.   
2.3.1 Effects of the cost of other ingredients
fc   
Derivative values of *ed
dp ,
*ed
dfp ,
*ed
dD ,
*ed
dfD ,
*ed
E and
*ed
F with respect to fc , 
respectively are studied and shown in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 The derivative analysis of the equilibrium solution
 
 
fc  
*ed
dp  
* 1
2
ed
fd
f f
dp
dc



   
*ed
dfp  
* 1
4
ed
df f
f
dp
dc

  
*ed
dD  
* 1
4
ed
fd
f
f df d
dD
dc k




 
 
*ed
dfD  
* 1
4
ed
df f
f df
dD
dc



 
 
*ed
E       * 1 1
4
ed
f df f f fm d f
E
f df d
c c kd
dc k
   

     

 
*ed
F       * 1 1
8
ed
f df f f fm d f
F
f df d
c c kd
dc k
   

     

 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as in Eq. (2.7). 
Table 2.2 shows that, as the cost of other ingredients fc  increases, the DG price and the 
quantity of DG decrease, the feed price increases and the quantity of feed decreases. As
fc
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increases, the feed price increases in contrast with the price of DG decreases according to 
Table 2.2. The increase of
*ed
dfp will result in a decrease of the quantity of feed because of the 
down sloping demand function in the assumption A1. 
 
* *
2
ed ed
df f d
f f
dp dp
dc dc

    (2.35) 
 
* *ed ed
df d d
f f f
dD k dD
dc dc
   (2.36) 
Eq. (2.35) shows that the feed price is less sensitive to change in
fc than the price of DG, 
due to 1f  . Eq. (2.36) shows that the quantity of feed as well as DG decreases as fc
increases. 
PROPOSITION 1. If the cost of one ton of other ingredients 
fc changes, then the profit 
of the E&DG producer changes twice higher than that of the feed producer in the ED model.  
Proof: In Table 2.2, there exist 
 
     * 1 1
4
ed
f df f f fm d f
E
f df d
c c kd
dc k
   

     
   (2.37) 
 
     * 1 1
8
ed
f df f f fm d f
F
f df d
c c kd
dc k
   

     
   (2.38) 
 where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as in Eq. (2.7). In addition, the term in Eq. (2.37) and 
(2.38),
 
  1 0df f f fm d fc c k        due to the assumption A1 that the quantity of 
feed is positive. 
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Thus, for any ,0 1f f   , Eq. (2.10) is rearranged to be Eq. (2.39) where the other 
ingredients' cost
fc is less than df fmc  , 
 
f df fmc c    (2.39) 
As
fc increases, 
*ed
E and
*ed
F will decrease. And from Eq. (2.40), it can be observed 
that the E&DG producer will have the profit loss twice higher than the feed producer as 
fc
increases, because of * *2ed edE F    from Table 2.1 for any given fc . Q.E.D. 
 
* *
2
ed ed
E F
f f
d d
dc dc
 
   (2.40) 
Therefore, the profit of the E&DG producer is more sensitive to changes in the other 
ingredients' cost, 
fc , than that of the feed producer. 
2.3.2 Effects of the DG fraction
f   
From two reasons: there is the assumption A4 that 0 1f  , and the increase of the DG 
fraction reduces the higher production cost to replace part of other ingredients in feed when 
the DG price (corn basis) is lower than the cost of other ingredients, here we would like to 
discuss the impact from the DG fraction 
f in the range of (0,1) . Derivative values of
*ed
dp ,
*ed
dfp ,
*ed
dD , 
*ed
dfD ,
*ed
E and
*ed
F with respect to f are studied and shown in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 The derivative analysis of the equilibrium solution w.r.t the DG fraction
 
 
f  
*ed
dp  
*
22
ed
df f fmd
f f
c cdp
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
 
 
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*ed
dfp  
*
4
ed
df f d
f d
dp c k
d k


 
*ed
dD     * 2
4
ed
df f fm d f d fd
f df d
c c k c kdD
d k
 
 
   

 
*ed
dfD  
*
4
ed
df f d
f d df
dD c k
d k 

 
 
*ed
E       *
2
1
4
ed
f d df f f fm d f
E
f df d
c k c c kd
d k
  
 
     

 
*ed
F       *
2
1
8
ed
f d df f f fm d f
F
f df d
c k c c kd
d k
  
 
     

 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    as in Eq. (2.7).  
PROPOSITION 2. If the DG fraction 
f changes, then the profit of the E&DG producer 
changes twice higher than that of the feed producer in the ED model.  
Proof: In Table 2.3, there exist 
 
     *
2
1
4
ed
f d df f f fm d f
E
f df d
c k c c kd
d k
  
 
     
 ,  (2.41) 
 
     *
2
1
8
ed
f d df f f fm d f
F
f df d
c k c c kd
d k
  
 
     
 .  (2.42) 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as in Eq. (7). In addition, the term
  1 0df f f fm d fc c k        due to the assumption A1 that the quantity of feed is 
positive.  
So, from Eqs. (2.41) and (2.42) we can find 
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 * */ 2 /ed edE f F fd d d d    .  (2.43) 
From Eq. (2.43), the profit of the E&DG producer is more sensitive to changes in the 
DG fraction than that of the feed producer. Q.E.D. 
There exist the conditions from Eq. (2.10) with 0 df f fmc c    and Eq. (2.31) with 
   df fm d df fm dc k c k      ,  when the DG fraction f is ranged in 0 and 1 as shown 
in the assumption A4.  
 0 1f  .  (2.44) 
For any positive dk , three cases derived from Table 2.3 are listed as below: 
 Case 1: 
f dc k  . That is /f dc k  ,  (2.45) 
 Case 2: 
f dc k  . That is /f dc k  ,  (2.46) 
 Case 3: 
f dc k . That is /f dc k  ,  (2.47) 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    as in Eq. (2.7). In addition, these three cases are three ones 
under different level of the other ingredients' cost.  
From Table 2.1, the equilibrium DG price is re-arranged as (2.48), 
 
    
*
1
2 2 2
df f f fm d f df f fm f ded
d
d f f d
c c k c c c k
p
k k
   
 
      
   .  (2.48) 
Thus, in Eq. (2.48) the DG price
*ed
dp decreases as the DG fraction f increases, 
according to condition in Eq. (2.10) 0 df f fmc c   . 
1) Case 1:
 f d
c k  , where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    . 
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That is /f dc k  from Eq. (2.45). We re-write the expressions of parameters in Case 1 
as following,   
  0 d d d f dp k p c k    .  (2.49) 
Note that  d d em c dd d e e d dp k c c c k k p p k       should be negative since
  em c dd d e e d dc c c k k p p k     is equal to the profit from one ton of processed corn.  
To guarantee that the E&DG producer has the positive profit by the term 
 0 d dp k   , the DG price is greater than the price of other ingredients, 
   /f d d d f dc p k k c p     .  (2.50) 
In Case 1:
 f d
c k 
 
with conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31), as
f  increases,
*ed
dp ,
*ed
dfD ,
*ed
F and
*ed
E keep decreasing, 
*ed
dfp increases and
*ed
dD decreases when
   / 2 2f df f fm d f dc c k c k     and increases when
   / 2 2f df f fm d f dc c k c k     . 
From Table 2.1, when 0f  , both producers have the maximum profit, however, the 
quantity of DG as well as ethanol is close to zero, which is running in the opposite direction 
with the expanding ethanol market. 
2) Case 2:
 f d
c k  , where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    . 
That is /f dc k  from Eq. (2.46). We re-write the expressions of parameters in Case 2 
as following,  
   0d d d f dp k p c k    ,  (2.51) 
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Similarly, to guarantee that the E&DG producer has the positive profit by the term 
  0d dp k   , the DG price is greater than the price of other ingredients, 
   /f d d d f dc p k k c p     .  (2.52) 
In Case 2:
 f d
c k  with conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31), as f  increases,
*ed
dp keeps 
decreasing;
*ed
dfp ,
*ed
dfD ,
*ed
F and
*ed
E do not change; however, the quantity of DG
*ed
dD
increases since
* /edd fdD d in Table 2.3 is positive. 
 
     * 2
0
4 4
ed
df f fm d f d f df f fmd
f df d df
c c k c k c cdD
d k
  
  
     
   ,  (2.53) 
if the condition 0df f fmc c    in Eq. (2.10) is true. In addition, the quantity of ethanol 
increases according to Eq. (2.3), which is helpful to the expanding ethanol market. 
3) Case 3:
 f d
c k , where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    . 
That is /f dc k  from Eq. (2.47). We re-write the expressions of parameters in Case 3 
as following,  
   0d d d f dp k p c k    ,  (2.54) 
Similarly, to guarantee above equations with the positive value of  d dp k  , the DG 
price can be greater than, equal to, or less than the price of other ingredients. 
In Case 3:
 f d
c k with conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31), as f  increases, 
*ed
dp and
*ed
dfp keep decreasing, however,
*ed
dD ,
*ed
dfD ,
*ed
F and
*ed
E increases. The quantity of DG
*ed
dD  increases since
* /edd fdD d in Table 2.3 is positive.  
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     * 2
0
4 4
ed
df f fm d f d f df f fmd
f df d df
c c k c k c cdD
d k
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  
     
   . 
 (2.55) 
Moreover, the quantity of ethanol increases from Eq. (2.3) that there is the fixed proportion 
in the quantity between ethanol and DG, which is helpful to the expanding ethanol market.  
In sum, the analysis for these 3 Cases is summarized in Table 2.4. For Case 1 and Case 
2, the DG price should be greater than other ingredients' cost in order to guarantee the 
positive profit for the E&DG producer; for Case 3, however, there is no such condition 
relative to the DG price and other ingredients' cost. 
Table 2.4 Condition analysis for each case
 
Case Conditions Derived conditions when 
0 1f   
The DG price 
f  
1 /f dc k   
0 df f fmc c   ,
   df fm d df fm dc k c k        
d fp c  0 1f   
2 /f dc k   d fp c  0 1f   
3 /f dc k   ,
,
d f
d f
d f
p c
p c
p c



 
0 1f   
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as shown in Eq. (2.7). 
Under different cases, we summarize the change of *ed
dp ,
*ed
dfp ,
*ed
dD ,
*ed
dfD ,
*ed
F and
*ed
E in Table 2.5, as the DG fraction f  increases. In Table 2.5,  ,  ,  represent 
decreasing, no change, and increasing, respectively. 
Table 2.5 The change of equilibrium solution as the DG fraction increases 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
36 
 
f dc k  0  0  0  
*ed
dp        
*ed
dfp        
*ed
dD  
 , when
 
 2
df f fm d
f
f d
c c k
c k


 


; 
 , when
 
 2
df f fm d
f
f d
c c k
c k


 


. 
    
*ed
dfD        
*ed
F        
*ed
E        
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as shown in Eq. (2.7). 
Overall, under conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31), the E&DG producer is affected more 
by changes in
f and fc than the feed producer in the ED model. Our objective is to find how 
the change in the DG fraction can help the expanding ethanol market with the change in other 
ingredients' cost level.  
As the increase of
fc , both producers lose profit. Moreover, the E&DG producer loses 
more profit than the feed producer because the leader has twice as much profit loss as the 
follower.  
With conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31), as an increase in the DG fraction
f  
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1) when
f dc k   in Case 1,  the E&DG producer has the profit loss more than the feed 
producer does. The feed producer will prefer to have the DG fraction as small as 
possible and the E&DG producer will sell DG as less as possible. Both producers 
have the maximum profit with a small amount of DG by a small DG fraction, which 
is not helpful to the ethanol market since the amount of ethanol is small; 
2) when
f dc k   in Case 2, both producers have no profit loss. Both producers can more 
quantity of DG produced with the higher DG fraction even though none of them has 
more benefit. the other ingredients' cost is equal to a constant, we will not study Case 
2;  
3) when
f dc k   in Case 3, the E&DG producer benefits more than the feed producer 
does. Both producers prefer to have the higher DG fraction in order for the higher 
profit, which results in the higher quantity of DG as well as ethanol. Under this case, 
it boosts the expanding ethanol market.  
In order to show the numerical example in the following section, Case 3:
 f d
c k  with 
the conditions 0 df f fmc c    in Eq. (2.10), and    df fm d df fm dc k c k       inEq. 
(2.31),
 
is used for the succeeding study.  
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3. THE CENTRALLY COORDINATED (CC) MODEL 
Centrally Coordinated (CC) model is introduced as a benchmark to the ED model. The 
E&DG producer, together with the feed producer, form a group as the CC model, to evaluate 
the performance of the ED model. In the CC model, two producers are interdependent and 
act as a group to maximize the total profit. Jeuland and Shugan [20] pointed out that the total 
profit is maximized and channel members have the most profits to divide.  
3.1 Optimal solution of the CC model 
Within the framework of consolidation, both the E&DG producer and the feed producer 
act coherently so as to maximize the total profit as shown in Eq. (3.1), 
  CC df e em c dd d f df d fm dfR R c Q c Q c D c D D c D         .  (3.1) 
In Eq. (3.1), the first term
dfR  is the revenue from selling feed in the feed market and 
equals to
df dfp D ; the second term eR  is the revenue from selling ethanol in the ethanol market 
and equals to e ep D ; the third term emc Q  is the joint production cost for the E&DG production; 
the fourth term cc Q  is the cost for corn for the joint production of ethanol and DG; the fifth 
term dd dc D  is the drying cost for each ton of DG after the joint production; the sixth term
 f df dc D D  is the cost of other ingredients for the feed production; and the final term
fm dfc D is the total processing cost of the feed production.  
Similarly as the ED model, the CC model also faces the demand function of feed
  /df df df dfD p   from the feed market. The central decision-maker in the CC model 
only sets the feed price dfp  as the decision variable according to the assumption A5. After 
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substituting Eqs. (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) into Eq. (3.2), the central decision-maker in the CC 
model maximizes the profit function with respect to
dfp  as shown in Equation (3.2),  
 Max     1
df
e e f em f c f df df
CC df dd f f f fm
p
d d d df
k p c c p
p c c c
k k k
   
 

 
         
 
.  (3.2) 
The concavity of the profit function of central decision-maker in
dfp is guaranteed by the 
second-order sufficient condition: 
 2 2/ 2 / 0CC df dfp       .  (3.3) 
Hence, the first-order necessary condition of Eq. (3.2) is the optimal condition of the CC 
model, as shown in Eq. (3.4), 
 
  1 2
0
df f f fm d f d df
CC
df df d
c c k k p
p k
  

    
 

.  (3.4) 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    as in Eq. (2.7). 
Then, the optimal feed price *cc
dfp  shown in Eq. (3.5) is obtained from Eq. (3.4), where 
the superscript cc  represents the CC model: 
 
  
*
1
2
df f f fm d fcc
df
d
c c k
p
k
     
 .  (3.5) 
The price of feed, *cc
dfp also is positive since the condition in (3.6) is satisfied due to the 
condition of      1 1df f f fm d f df f f fm dc c k c c k               from Eq.(2.29), 
     1 2 1 2 0df f f fm d f f f fmc c k c c           ,  (3.6) 
where ,f fmc c are positive and (0,1)f  in the assumption A4.  
40 
 
The corresponding optimal solution of the CC model in
*cc
dfD , 
*cc
dD , 
*ccQ , *cc
eD , 
*cc
dfp , 
and *
CC  can also be obatined in a straightforward manner as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 The optimal solution of the CC model  
*cc
dfD    1
2
df f f fm d f
df d
c c k
k
  

   
 
*cc
dD    1
2
df f f fm d f
f
df d
c c k
k
  


   
 
*ccQ    
2
1
2
df f f fm d f
f
df d
c c k
k
  


   
 
*cc
eD    
2
1
2
df f f fm d f
e f
df d
c c k
k
k
  


   
 
*cc
dfp    1
2
df f f fm d f
d
c c k
k
     
 
*
CC     
2
2
1
4
df f f fm d f
df d
c c k
k
  

   
 
In Table 3.1,
 
 em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as in Eq. (2.7). 
Next, a comparison between the ED model and the CC model is shown in the following 
section under conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31).  
3.2 The comparison between the ED model and the CC model 
The solutions in the ED model and the CC model are listed in the Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 The comparison between the ED model and the CC model 
 The ED model The CC model 
*
dfD    1
4
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
  1
2
df f f fm d f
df d
c c k
k
  

   
 
*
dD    1
4
df f f fm d f
f
d df
c c k
k
  


   
 
  1
2
df f f fm d f
f
df d
c c k
k
  


   
 
*Q    
2
1
4
df f f fm d f
f
d df
c c k
k
  


   
 
  
2
1
2
df f f fm d f
f
df d
c c k
k
  


   
 
*
eD    
2
1
4
df f f fm d f
e f
d df
c c k
k
k
  


   
 
  
2
1
2
df f f fm d f
e f
df d
c c k
k
k
  


   
 
*
dfp     4 1
4
df df f f fm d f
d
c c k
k
       
 
  1
2
df f f fm d f
d
c c k
k
     
 
*
dp    1
2
df f f fm d f
d f
c c k
k
  

   
 
NA 
*
E     
2
2
1
8
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
NA 
*
F     
2
2
1
16
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
NA 
*
CC     
2
2
3 1
16
df f f fm d f
d df
c c k
k
  

   
 
   
2
2
1
4
df f f fm d f
df d
c c k
k
  

   
 
In Table 3.2,
 
 em c dd d e ec c c k k p     as in Eq. (2.7). 
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With conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31),  the solutions under the ED model and the CC 
model are existed simultaneously. We note that,  
 * *cc ed
df dfp p ,
* *2cc eddf dfD D .  (3.7) 
That is, the central decision-maker provides a lower
dfp  and twice more quantity of feed
dfD  than the ED model. According to the conversions in Eqs. (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), the 
central decision-maker provides twice more quantity of DG and twice more quantity of 
ethanol from twice more quantity of corn than the ED model,  
 * *2cc edd dD D ,
* *2cc edQ Q , * *2cc ede eD D .  (3.8) 
Nowadays, the corn ethanol industry is expanding because of the stimulation. Thus the 
CC model is better than the ED model to provide more quantity of ethanol to the ethanol 
market, in which the lower feed price is provided to the feed market than the ED model.  
  * * *ed edCC E F    .  (3.9) 
The CC model has the higher total profit than the ED model. And, the supply chain 
performance of the ED model is  * * */ 0.75ed edE F CC    , which is to reflect the 
capability of obtaining profit through the ratio of the total profit over the total optimal profit 
in the CC model [32]. Additionally, channel coordination is the economic incentive for 
producers to have the better performance.  
In the ED model, the E&DG producer has the performance * */ 0.50edE CC   , and the 
feed producer has the performance * */ 0.25edF CC   .  
* * * * * * *cc cc ed ed ed ed
CC E FTR TC TR TC       , since the increased total revenue is 
higher than the increased total cost when the CC model is compared to the ED model, where 
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the total revenue in the CC model is higher than that in the ED model, 
* * 0cc edTR TR TR    , and the total cost in the CC model is higher than that in the ED 
model, 
* * 0cc edTC TC TC    .  
Moreover, the revenue in selling ethanol in the CC model is twice as much as that in the 
ED model because the quantity of ethanol in the CC model is twice more than that in the ED 
model. 
 * * * *2 2cc cc ed ede e e e e eR p D R p D   .  (3.10) 
The revenue from selling feed in the CC model as well as in the ED model is
* * * * * *,cc cc cc ed ed eddf df df df df dfR p D R p D  , respectively. In addition, the ratio between these two 
models about the revenue in selling feed is following. 
 
   
   
* * *
* * *
4 11 1
2 24 2 1
ed ed ed
df df f f fm d fdf df df
cc cc cc
df df df df df f f fm d f
c c kR p D
R p D c c k
   
   
    
  
    
,  (3.11) 
where   1 0df f f fm d fc c k       from Eq. (2.29).  
For the expenses, the CC model is twice than the ED model in the total joint production 
cost, other ingredients' cost, and the processing cost, respectively. 
 
   
   
* *
* * * *
* *
2
2
2
cc ed
em c dd d em c dd d
cc cc ed ed
f df d f df d
cc ed
fm df fm df
c c c k Q c c c k Q
c D D c D D
c D c D
    
  

  (3.12) 
Overall, after the comparison between the ED model and the CC model, both producers 
would like to coordinate in the same group to split the total profit, due to a maximum total 
profit, where the increased total revenue is higher than the increased total cost. Moreover, 
from Eq. (3.8), the E&DG producer can provide more ethanol to the expanding ethanol 
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market because of the lower feed price. Based on these conclusions, government might want 
to facilitate the sharing of supply chain profit by subsidy, etc. to promote higher production 
of ethanol. 
3.2.1 The analysis of total profit with respect to the DG fraction
f  
 
     *
2
1
2
f d df f f fm d f
CC
f d df
c k c c kd
d k
  
 
     
   (3.13) 
 
       * *
2
3 1
8
ed ed
f d df f f fm d fE F
f d df
c k c c kd
d k
  
 
      
   (3.14) 
where  em c dd d e ec c c k k p    as shown in Eq. (2.7), and the term
  1 0df f f fm d fc c k       from Eq. (2.29).  
We noticed that      * * */ 3 / 4 /ed edE F f CC fd d d d     . As the same analysis 
from Table 2.5, as the DG fraction
f  increases,  
1) when 0f dc k  , 
*
CC and  * *ed edE F  keep decreasing;  
2) when 0f dc k  , 
*
CC and  * *ed edE F  do not change;  
3) when 0f dc k  , 
*
CC and  * *ed edE F  increase.  
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4. THE E&DG PRODUCER-DRIVEN STACKELBERG MODEL 
WITH A QUADRATIC UNIT JOINT PRODUCTION COST (EDQ) 
The producer of ethanol 
and DG with Quadratic unit 
joint production cost
The DG-based feed 
producer
Customers of
 DG-based feed
Customers of 
ethanol
dfp
dpep
 
Figure 4.1 Configuration of the EDQ model  
In this section, the E&DG Producer-Stackelberg Model with quadratic unit joint 
production cost in the E&DG producer (EDQ) in Figure 4.1 is proposed according the 
following assumptions. 
A8. The unit joint production cost to process one unit of corn is a quadratic function about 
the processed quantity of corn. And, the total joint production cost is a monotonic increasing 
polynomial function with respect to the processed quantity of corn.  
 
2 3ˆ 3EMC (Q) Q Q Q      (4.1) 
From several literatures there exists the quadratic unit production cost function
2ˆ /EMC (Q) Q Q Q     which has the similar curve shown in Figure 4.2, where the unit 
joint production cost decrease when  (0, / 2 ]Q    and increases when  ( / 2 , ]Q    . 
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Thus, the total joint production cost is 2 3ˆ
EMC (Q) Q Q Q     . In order to keep the 
monotonic increasing, there exists 3  since there is only one Q 's value such that  
 2
ˆ
2 3 0EM
dC (Q)
Q Q
dQ
        (4.2) 
 
Figure 4.2 Unit joint production cost 
 
Figure 4.3 Total joint production cost 
For the E&DG producer, Figure 4.2 is the unit joint production cost and Figure 4.3 is the 
total joint production cost. 
New Parameters 
ˆ
EMC (Q)  
2 3ˆ 3EMC (Q) Q Q Q     , the joint production cost of processing one ton of 
corn ( $/ton ), where 0, 0    
In this section, a detailed formulation and analysis about a Stackelberg model are given 
between the E&DG producer and the feed producer, where the former is the Stackelberg 
leader and the latter is the Stackelberg follower [41]. In the following “EDQ” is denoted as 
the E&DG producer-Driven Stackelberg model where the E&DG producer with a quadratic 
unit joint product cost being the leader.   
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4.1 The feed producer’s profit maximization problem 
In order to determine the Stackelberg equilibrium by backward induction, we firstly 
solve the feed producer‟s profit problem when the E&DG producer‟s decision variable dp is 
given.         In this section, we describe the profit maximization problem of the feed 
producer. She only purchases DG from the E&DG producer and then sells feed to the feed 
market. 
       F df(p ) is the objective profit function of the feed producer. In the objective 
function, the feed producer as the follower assumes dp given, and decides on dfp as below:  
  Max    
df
F df df df d df f fm df f df d
p
(p ) p D p D c D c D D       (4.3) 
In Eq. (4.3),
 F
 , is the objective profit function of the feed producer whose profit is 
equal to total revenue from selling feed minus her cost. The first term
dfR  is the revenue from 
selling feed to the customers in the feed market, and equals to
df dfp D ; the second term d dp D  
is the cost of purchasing DG from the E&DG producer, the third term
fm dfc D is the processing 
cost of DG-based feed production, and the last one,
  f df dc D D  is the cost of other 
ingredients for producing one unit of feed, and equals to  1f f dfc D . 
4.1.1 The standardization of the problem of the feed producer 
In this section, we standardize the nonlinear objective functions of the feed producer. 
Through substituting the demand function into this problem, the standard minimum problem 
of the feed producer is shown as following,  
  Max    1
df
F df df df d df f fm df f f df
p
(p ) p D p D c D c D       .  (4.4) 
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4.1.2 The best response function of the feed producer 
Knowing the given dp from the E&DG producer, it is easy to verify that this standardized 
objective function of the feed producer is convex in the price of feed
dfp , by
2 2/ 2 / 0F df dfp       . By the first order necessary condition setting / 0F dfp   , the 
unique best response function of the feed producer is
  ˆ 1 / 2df d df fm f f f dp (p ) c c p       . After substituting the best response function 
into
d f dfD D , the quantity of DG purchased by the feed producer can be represented as
    1 / 2d f df f df fm f f f d dfD D c c p           . 
   ˆ ˆ:         1 / 2df d df d df fm f f f dp (p ) p (p ) c c p         (4.5) 
4.2 The E&DG producer’s profit maximization problem 
In this section, we describe the E&DG producer‟s profit maximization problem. This is 
the second step in determining the Stackelberg equilibrium. In this section, the maximization 
profit problem of the E&DG producer is described as follows, 
 ˆE d e e d d EM c dd d(p ) p D p D C (Q) c Q c D        (4.6) 
( )E dp , the objective profit function of the E&DG producer, is a straight-forward 
algebraic statement which profit is equal to his revenues less his cost. The E&DG producer 
as the leader decides on dp  and assumes dfp given. Because he is the price-taker to ethanol, 
the selling quantity of ethanol is ek Q . 
 ˆMax   
d
E d e e d d EM c dd d
p
(p ) p D p D C (Q) c Q c D        (4.7) 
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where /f df dQ D k . In the objective function from Eq. (4.7), the term e e e ep D p k Q is the 
revenue from selling ethanol; the second term
d d d f dfp D p D  is the revenue from selling 
DG to the feed producer; the third term ˆEMC (Q)  is the joint production cost; the fourth term
cc Q  is the cost of corn; the fifth term dd dc D is the drying cost for obtaining the amount of DG, 
dD . 
4.2.1 The standardization of the problem of the E&DG producer  
In this section, we standardize the nonlinear objective function for the E&DG producer. 
Through substituting the demand function, the standardized minimum problem of the E&DG 
producer is shown as following,  
 
ˆ ˆMax   /
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/ /
d
E d e e f df df d d f df df
p
EM df df f d c f df df d dd f df df
(p ) p k D (p ) k p D (p )
C (D (p )) k c D (p ) k c D (p )
 
  
  
  
  (4.8) 
where    
2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ/ 3 / /EM df df f df df d f df df d f df df dC (D (p )) D (p ) k D (p ) k D (p ) k       ,
 ˆ /df df df df dfD (p ) p   . 
The best response function ˆ ( )df dp p as a function of dp  in Eq. (4.5) is substituted into Eq. 
(4.8). In order to have the concavity of the profit function of the E&DG producer in dp , the 
second-order sufficient condition should be less than zero,
 
2 2/ 0E dp    : 
  3 2 2 4 5
2 2
3 3
4 2 3 3 1
/ 0
4
d df f d df f df fm f f d f f
E d
d df
k k c c p
p
k
         

      
      (4.9) 
A9. The E&DG producer has a concavity profit function in the DG price.  
Therefore, the DG price is  
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53
d
f
p


   (4.10) 
where   3 2 3 44 2 3 3 1d df f d df f df fm f f fk k c c               . 
Eq. (4.11), the first-order necessary condition of Eq. (4.8) in dp , is the equilibrium 
condition of the E&DG producer. 
 0E
dp



  (4.11) 
From Eq. (4.11), there exist two feasible solutions of the DG price. 
 
1
5
2
3
edq
d
f
p

  
   (4.12) 
 
2
5
2
3
edq
d
f
p

  
   (4.13) 
where   3 2 3 44 2 3 3 1d df f d df f df fm f f fk k c c               , 
     4 2 2 2 34 4 3 3 1d df f d df d df f f d df fm f f e e c dd d fk k k k c c k p c c k                   . 
After separately substituting the DG prices in Eq. (4.12) and (4.13) into the best response 
function in Eq. (4.5), the feed prices are shown in Eqs. (4.14) and (4.15), 
 
3 2 3 4
1
4
2 3 3
3
d df f d df f df fedq
df
f
k k
p
      

  
   (4.14) 
 
3 2 3 4
2
4
2 3 3
3
d df f d df f df fedq
df
f
k k
p
      

  
   (4.15) 
where
     4 2 2 2 34 4 3 3 1d df f d df d df f f d df fm f f e e c dd d fk k k k c c k p c c k                   . 
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In the assumption A1, the price of DG as well as the feed is positive.  
1) 2 0    and 2 0       
Eqs. (4.12) and (4.13) are positive values when 2 0    and 2 0   . Comparing 
with these two solutions, we find that the E&DG producer has higher profit when he selects 
the DG price
1edq
dp  from Eq.(4.16). 
 
3
1 2
2 3 3 9
4
0
27
edq edq
E E
d df fk  

      (4.16) 
where   is positive. 
When 2 0    and 2 0   , the equilibrium price of DG in the EDQ model is 
shown in Eq. (4.17) where the superscript es denotes the ED model and * is the designation 
of optimality. 
 
*
5
2
3
edq
d
f
p

  
    (4.17) 
where   3 2 3 44 2 3 3 1d df f d df f df fm f f fk k c c               , 
     4 2 2 2 34 4 3 3 1d df f d df d df f f d df fm f f e e c dd d fk k k k c c k p c c k                   . 
After substituting the equilibrium DG price into the best response function in Eq.(4.5), 
the equilibrium feed price is,
  
 
3 2 3 4
*
4
2 3 3
3
d df f d df f df fedq
df
f
k k
p
      

  
   (4.18) 
where
     4 2 2 2 34 4 3 3 1d df f d df d df f f d df fm f f e e c dd d fk k k k c c k p c c k                   . 
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Table 4.1 shows the equilibrium solution corresponding to the quantities and the profits 
in the supply chain, where all values are positive and the superscript edq represents the EDQ 
model. 
Table 4.1 The equilibrium solution of the ED model when 2 0    and 2 0    
*edq
dfD  
3 2 3
4
2 3
3
d df f d df f
df f
k k    
 
  
 
*edq
dD  
3 2 3
3
2 3
3
d df f d df f
df f
k k    
 
  
 
*edqQ  3 2 3
3
2 3
3
d df f d df f
d df f
k k
k
    
 
  
 
*edq
eD  
3 2 3
3
2 3
3
d df f d df f
e
d df f
k k
k
k
    
 
  
 
*edq
dfp  
3 2 3 4
4
2 3 3
3
d df f d df f df f
f
k k      

  
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where   3 2 3 44 2 3 3 1d df f d df f df fm f f fk k c c               , 
     4 2 2 2 34 4 3 3 1d df f d df d df f f d df fm f f e e c dd d fk k k k c c k p c c k                   . 
4.3 The comparison between the ED model and the EDQ model 
1) When 2 0    and 2 0   , the ED model has the equilibrium solution as shown in 
Table 2.1 and the EDQ model has the equilibrium solution as shown in Table 4.1. 
* *edq ed
E E  
 
     
  
  
                                               
  
 
    
 
         
  
  
             
  
  
   
       
               
   
               
   
       
  
  
  
      
                                   
  
  
      
                    
                 
                         
                                 
  
   (4.19) 
Eq. (4.19) is the profit difference of the E&DG producer between the ED model and the 
EDQ model. 
 
* *edq ed
F F    
                                           
 
    
    
 
 
     
       
    
            
    
   
  
                    
          
     
          
                                  
  (4.20) 
Eq. (4.20)  is the profit difference of the feed producer between the ED model and the 
EDQ model. 
 
* *edq edQ Q   
    
      
     
                                             
        
    
                
    
 
 
   
  (4.21) 
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Eq. (4.21)  is the quantity difference of corn between the ED model and the EDQ model. 
* *edq ed
d dp p 
 
      
     
    
            
      
                   
          
                
               
    (4.22) 
Eq. (4.22) is the price difference of DG between the ED model and the EDQ model. 
* *edq ed
df dfp p   
 
                                          
   
 
    
    
                
         
   
    
    (4.23) 
Eq. (4.23) is the price difference of the DG-based feed between the ED model and the 
EDQ model. 
From the above comparison, it is difficult to find in which model the E&DG producer or 
the feed producer has the higher profit. Under this situation, it will be presented by a 
numerical example.   
4.4 The comparison of total joint production cost between the ED model and EDQ 
model 
When the equilibrium quantity of corn in the EDQ model is equal to the equilibrium 
quantity of corn in the ED model, comparing with the objective profit functions in Eq. (4.6) 
with the case of nonlinear joint production cost and Eq. (2.16) with the case of linear joint 
production cost, the profit difference of the E&DG producer between Eq. (2.16) and Eq. (4.6) 
is equal to  
  2 3 2ˆ 3 3EM em em emC (Q) c Q Q Q Q c Q c Q Q Q                (4.24) 
Hence, when Eq. (4.24) is greater than zero, the E&DG producer has higher joint 
production cost in the EDQ model than in the ED model. When Eq. (4.24) is equal to zero, 
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there is no difference in the joint production cost of the E&DG producer in both models. 
Otherwise, the E&DG producer has lower joint production cost in the EDQ model than in the 
ED model. 
1) If for any positive quantity of corn Q, the joint production cost in the nonlinear case is 
always bigger than or equal to that in the linear case, ˆEM emC (Q) c Q as shown in the Figure 
4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4 Total joint production cost and average joint production cost (Situation 1) 
Hence, for any positive Q, the term   23emc Q Q      in Eq. (4.24) is greater than 
or equal to zero, 
   23 0emc Q Q        (4.25) 
And the derivative of   23emc Q Q     with respect to Q is, 
 
  23
3 2
emd c Q Q
Q
dQ
  
 
  
     (4.26) 
We find that   
2
2 23 / 2 0emd c Q Q dQ        . By setting that Eq. (4.26) 
equals to zero, the term   23emc Q Q     achieves the minimal value when
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 3 / 2Q   . As we know from Eq. (4.25), for any positive Q, 
  23 0emc Q Q      . Therefore, when  3 / 2Q   ,  
 
        
2
23 3 3 / 2 3 / 2
1
0
4
em em
em
c Q Q c
c
         

      
  
  (4.27) 
When the unit joint production cost in the linear case is less than / 4 , Eq. (4.27) is 
greater than or equal to zero for any positive Q. That is, the E&DG producer has higher joint 
production cost in the EDQ model than in the ED model. 
 / 4emc    (4.28) 
2) Then, when / 4emc  , for any positive quantity of corn Q, 
ˆ
EMC (Q)  and emc Q have 
two intersections in the Figure 4.5 and there is one intersections in the Figure 4.6.  
 / 4emc    (4.29) 
 
Figure 4.5 Total joint production cost and average joint production cost (Situation 2) 
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Figure 4.6 Total joint production cost and average joint production cost (Situation 3) 
Hence, for any positive Q, the intersection can be obtained from setting the term
  23emc Q Q      in Eq. (4.24) is equal to zero, 
   23 0emc Q Q        (4.30) 
Then, two solutions of the quantity of corn Q from Eq. (4.30) are, 
 
1
3
emc
Q



 ,  (4.31) 
 
2
3
emc
Q



 ,  (4.32) 
where,
 1 2
Q Q . 
In order to guarantee that there are two intersections as shown in the Figure 4.5, 
Eqs.(4.31) and (4.32) should be positive. Hence,  
 / 4emc     (4.33) 
a. When  1 / 3emQ Q c    , the term   23emc Q Q      in Eq. (4.24) is 
greater than zero so that Eq. (4.24) is greater than zero for any positive Q. That is, the 
E&DG producer has higher joint production cost in the EDQ model than in the ED 
model.  
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Proof: for any positive  1 / 3emQ Q c    , 
  2 2 21 1
2 2
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1
3 [( ) 3 ] [( ) 3 ]
3 ( ) ( ) [ 3 ( )]( )
[ 3 (2 )]( ) [ 3 (2 2 ) / 3)]( )
[( 2 ) / 3)]( ) 0
em em em
em
em
c Q Q c Q Q c Q Q
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q c Q Q
c Q Q
        
   
    
 
          
       
      
   
  (4.34) 
b. When  2 / 3emQ Q c    , the term   23emc Q Q      in Eq. (4.24) is 
greater than zero so that Eq. (4.24) is greater than zero for any positive Q. That is, the 
E&DG producer has higher joint production cost in the EDQ model than in the ED 
model.  
Proof: for any positive  2 / 3emQ Q c    , 
  2 2 22 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
3 [( ) 3 ] [( ) 3 ]
3 ( ) ( ) [ 3 ( )]( )
[ 3 (2 )]( ) [ 3 (2 2 ) / 3)]( )
[( 2 ) / 3)]( ) 0
em em em
em
em
c Q Q c Q Q c Q Q
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q c Q Q
c Q Q
        
   
    
 
          
         
        
    
  (4.35) 
c. Otherwise, when    1 2/ 3 / 3em emc Q Q Q c         , the term 
  23emc Q Q      in Eq. (4.24) is less than or equal to zero so that Eq. (4.24) is 
less than or equal to zero for any positive Q. That is, the E&DG producer has lower joint 
production cost in the EDQ model than in the ED model. 
 
In order to guarantee that there is one intersection as shown in the Figure 4.6, Eq.(4.31) 
should be non-positive and Eq.(4.32) should be positive. Hence,  
 emc    (4.36) 
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a. When  2 / 3emQ Q c    , the term   23emc Q Q      in Eq. (4.24) is 
greater than zero so that Eq. (4.24) is greater than zero for any positive Q. That is, the 
E&DG producer has higher joint production cost in the EDQ model than in the ED 
model.  
Proof: for any positive  2 / 3emQ Q c    , 
  2 2 22 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2 2
2
3 [( ) 3 ] [( ) 3 ]
3 ( ) ( ) [ 3 ( )]( )
[ 3 (2 )]( ) [ 3 (2 2 ) / 3)]( )
[( 2 ) / 3)]( ) 0
em em em
em
em
c Q Q c Q Q c Q Q
Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q
Q Q Q c Q Q
c Q Q
        
   
    
 
          
         
        
    
  (4.37) 
b. Otherwise, when  2 / 3emQ Q c    , the term   23emc Q Q      in Eq. 
(4.24) is less than or equal to zero so that Eq. (4.24) is less than or equal to zero for any 
positive Q. That is, the E&DG producer has lower joint production cost in the EDQ 
model than in the ED model. 
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5. APPLICATION AND NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
This section is to present the analysis and application of the numerical example for all 
models. One ton of corn often results in 1/3 ton of ethanol and 1/3 ton of DG in the dry mill 
processing [1], thus let us assume that the proportion of ethanol as well as DG produced from 
one unit of corn, 1/ 3e dk k  .  
The extension at Iowa State University publicly announce the price of corn, DG, and 
ethnanol from Oct. 2006 to Sept. 2009 [45]. In Iowa, the price of corn has ranged from 
$2.33/bushel to $6.84/bushel ($91/ton~$269/ton); the price of DG (with 10% moisture) has 
ranged from $71/ton ~$196/ton; and the price of ethanol has ranged from $1.42/gallon to 
$2.80/gallon ($468/ton ~$924/ton) [45]. Hence, let us assume that the price of ethanol
$900 / tonep  , and the corn cost $180 / toncc  . Perrin [46] estimated an average drying 
cost of $25.80/ton of dry matter in DG. In this paper, we assume that the E&DG producer has 
the joint production cost of processing one ton of corn $80/tonemc   and the drying cost of 
obtaining one ton of dried DG $60/tonddc  . The processing cost of producing one ton of 
feed is assumed $10/tonfmc  .  
As for the DG fraction, the maximum DG fraction for swine is recommended from 0 to 
0.60 [47], appropriate DG fraction for cattle has been achieved at the levels of 0.40 to 0.60 
[48],[49]. In the case of the DG fraction for swine and beef, let us assume 0.40f   
[50],[51],[52],[53]. 
In summary, the parameters in the numerical example except the ethanol price and the 
other ingredients' cost are: 
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51/ 3, 180, 5 10 , 0.40,
$750/ton, $80/ton, $180/ton, $60/ton, $10/ton.
e d df df f
e em c dd fm
k k
p c c c c
       
    
 
From a survey by Saunder and Rosentrater [54], for the E&DG producer, the average 
amount of DG is 131,205 tons per year and the median value is 74,000tons per year. Since 
the amount of DG can indicate the amount of corn for the production, so the corresponding 
average amount of corn is 393,605 tons per year and the median value is 222,000tons per 
year [55]. And the average capacity of each E&DG producer in 2008 is 58M gallon of 
ethanol (520,000tons of corn) from the EPA's record. In this paper, we assume the capacity 
of the E&DG producer is 450,000 tons of corn (which also can be represented by 150,000 
tons of DG or 150,000tons of ethanol) [55]. 
5.1 Numerical solution of the ES model 
As the other ingredients' cost increases, the profit of both producers decreases and the 
quantity of DG as well as ethanol decrease, which is no helpful to the expanding ethanol 
market. However, with the higher DG fraction may help to increase the amount of ethanol for 
the ethanol market and increase the profit of both producers. 
For this numerical example, from condition in Eq.(2.10) there exist 170f df fmc c  
and from condition in Eq.(2.31) there is
( ) 170 / 3 30 ( ) 170 / 3df fm d df fm dc k c k           . Therefore, the other ingredients' 
cost is less than$170/ton .  
5.1.1 The analysis of the ES model with respect to the other ingredients' cost fc  
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Figure 5.1 The profits of both producers with respect to cost of other ingredients 
 
Figure 5.2 The quantity of DG as well as feed with respect to cost of other ingredients 
When 0.40f  , as the other ingredients' cost increases, from Figure 5.1 both producers 
lose profit and from Figure 5.2 the quantity of feed as well as DG decreases. Since Eq. (2.3) 
shows the fixed ratio relation of quantity between ethanol and DG, the quantity of ethanol 
deceases simultaneously. 
5.1.2 The analysis of the ES model with respect to the DG fraction
f  
As we know, with conditions in Eqs. (2.10) and (2.31), there are 3 cases: 1)
f dc k  ; 2)
f dc k  ; 3) f dc k . Thus, we will show three cases under different levels of the other 
ingredients' cost (i.e., forage, alfalfa, and corn), in that the impact of the DG fraction on 
increasing the quantity of DG as well as ethanol is presented. 
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Case 1:
 f d
c k  , where ( )em c dd d e ec c c k k p    .  
Therefore, the other ingredients' cost is $90/tonfc  according to f dc k  . Let us 
assume the other ingredients' cost $80/tonfc  .  
 
Figure 5.3 The profits of both producers with respect to the DG fraction (Case 1) 
 
Figure 5.4 The price of DG as well as feed with respect to the DG fraction (Case 1)  
 
Figure 5.5 The quantity of DG as well as feed with respect to the DG fraction (Case 1)  
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As the DG fraction increases, we will have the findings from Case 1 as following. 
Both producers have the lower profit from Figure 5.3; the price of DG decreases and is 
higher than other ingredients' cost, and the feed price increases from Figure 5.4; the quantity 
of feed decreases but the quantity of DG increases from Figure 5.5, since the range of DG 
fraction is 0 1f   from the assumption A4 and that the quantity of DG increases as the 
increase of the DG fraction when ( ) / (2( )) 4.5f df f fm d f dc c k c k      from Table 2.5. 
a) When 1f  , there is the highest feed price $160/tondfp  which is less than the 
maximum feed price $180/tondf  , thus the quantity of feed decreases to the 
lowest amount according to the down-slope demand function of feed, but 
quantity of DG is highest amount. Both producers have the lowest profit. 
b) When 0f  , there is the lowest feed price $157/ton , thus the quantity of feed 
achieves the highest amount according to the down-slope demand function of 
feed. At the same time, the DG price is approaching infinite because the feed 
producer utilizes extremely small amount of DG that is close to zero for the feed 
production. The feed producer has the profit from selling more feed and the 
E&DG producer has the profit from selling extremely small amount of DG with 
the extremely high DG price. 
And usually the DG fraction for all kinds of animal [50],[51],[52] has been ranged from0 
to 0.6. So, the E&DG producer has *ed
E ranged in [$17,640,000,$20,250,000) , and the 
feed producer has *ed
F  ranged in [$8,820,000,$10,125,000) . The DG price is ranged in
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[$160/ton, )  and the feed price is ranged in ($157/ton,$159/ton] . And the DG quantity is 
ranged in (0ton,252,000ton]  and the feed quantity is ranged in [420,000ton,450,000ton) . 
When given 0.40f  , the E&DG producer has
* $18,490,000edE  and the feed 
producer has * $9,245,000edF  . The DG price is 
* $197/toneddp  and the feed price is
* $158/toneddfp  . In addition, the DG quantity is
* 172,000toneddD   and the feed quantity is
* 430,000toneddfD  . 
With the lowest DG fraction 0f  , both producers have the maximum profit and the 
quantity of feed is the maximum since the feed price is the lowest. However, the quantity of 
DG as well as ethanol is the lowest and approaching to zero since the DG price is infinite, 
which is not helpful for the expanding ethanol market. 
Case 2:
 f d
c k  , where ( )em c dd d e ec c c k k p    . 
Therefore, the other ingredients' cost is $90/tonfc  according to f dc k  . Let us 
assume the other ingredients' cost $90/tonfc  . 
 
Figure 5.6 The profits of both producers with respect to the DG fraction (Case 2)   
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Figure 5.7 The price of DG as well as feed with respect to the DG fraction (Case 2)   
 
Figure 5.8 The quantity of DG as well as feed with respect to the DG fraction (Case 2)  
As the DG fraction increases, we will have the findings as following: 
Both producers have the same profit from Figure 5.6; the price of DG decreases and is 
higher than other ingredients' cost, and the feed price does not change from Figure 5.7; the 
quantity of feed does not change, however, the quantity of DG keeps increasing from Figure 
5.8. The non-change of feed price results in the non-change of quantity of feed according to 
the down-slope demand function of feed. 
a) When 1f  , the quantity of DG is approaching the highest 400,000ton  by 
following Eq. (2.1) and the DG price approaches the lowest $130/ton . 
b) When 0f  , the DG price is approaching infinite because the feed producer 
utilizes extremely small amount of DG, which is close to zero for the feed 
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production. The feed producer has the profit $8,000,000  and the E&DG producer 
has the profit $16,000,000 . 
Under this condition of Case 2, Eq. (2.3) tells that the quantity of ethanol is expanding as 
the DG fraction increases, even though there is no change in each one's profit. The lower DG 
price attracts the feed producer to use more DG in the feed. 
And usually the DG fraction for all kinds of animal has been ranged in (0,0.6] 
[50],[51],[52]. Therefore, the E&DG producer has *ed
E is $16,000,000  , and the feed 
producer has *ed
F is$8,000,000 . The DG price is ranged in[$156/ton, )  and the feed price 
is$160/ton . And the DG quantity is ranged in (0ton,240,000ton]  and the feed quantity is
400,000ton . 
When given 0.40f  , the E&DG producer has
* $16,000,000edE  and the feed 
producer has * $8,000,000edF  . The DG price is 
* $190/toneddp  and the feed price is
* $160/toneddfp  . In addition, the DG quantity is
* 160,000toneddD   and the feed quantity is
* 400,000toneddfD  . 
With the highest DG fraction 1f  , both producers do not change the profit and the 
quantity of feed is constant since the feed price is constant. However, the DG price is the 
lowest so that the quantity of DG as well as ethanol is the highest, which is helpful for the 
expanding ethanol market. Under the condition in Case 2, with the highest DG fraction, even 
there is no change in profit for both producers, the E&DG producer produces the maximum 
quantity of ethanol. 
Case 3: f dc k , where ( )em c dd d e ec c c k k p    . 
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Therefore, the other ingredients' cost is $90/tonfc  according to f dc k  . Let us 
assume the other ingredients' cost $150/tonfc  , since Eq. (2.10) requires
170f df fmc c   . 
In terms of the impact from the change of DG fraction
f , the change of each producer's 
profit is shown in Figure 5.9; the change of price of DG as well as feed is shown in Figure 
5.10; and the change of quantity of DG as well as feed is shown in Figure 5.11. 
 
Figure 5.9 The profits of both producers with respect to the DG fraction (Case 3)  
 
Figure 5.10 The price of DG as well as feed with respect to the DG fraction (Case 3)  
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Figure 5.11 The quantity of DG as well as feed with respect to the DG fraction (Case 3)  
As the DG fraction increases, we will have the findings from Case 3 as following: 
Both producers have the higher profit from Figure 5.9; the price of DG as well as feed 
decrease from Figure 5.10; and the quantity of DG as well as feed increase from Figure 5.11.  
a) When 1f  , there is the lowest feed price, thus the quantity of feed achieves 
the highest amount according to the down-slope demand function of feed. The 
more DG in the feed is, the more profit of both producers gains. 
b) When 0f  , there is the highest feed price $175/ton which is less than the 
maximum feed price $180/tondf  , thus the quantity of feed achieves the 
lowest amount according to the down-slope demand function of feed. At the 
same time, the DG price is approaching infinite because the feed producer 
utilizes extremely small amount of DG, which is close to zero for the feed 
production. The feed producer has the profit from selling 100,000ton of feed and 
the E&DG producer has the profit by selling extremely small amount of DG with 
the extremely high DG price. 
And usually the DG fraction for all kinds of animal has been ranged in (0,0.6] 
[50],[51],[52],[53]. So, the E&DG producer has *ed
E ranged in ($1,000,000,$7,840,000]  , 
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and the feed producer has *ed
F  ranged in ($500,000,$3,920,000] . The DG price is ranged 
in[$136/ton, )  and the feed price is ranged in [$166/ton,$175/ton) . And the DG quantity is 
ranged in (0ton,168,000ton]  and the feed quantity is ranged in (100,000ton,280,000ton]. 
When given 0.40f  , the E&DG producer has
* $4,840,000edE  and the feed 
producer has * $2,420,000edF  . The DG price is 
* $145/toneddp  and the feed price is
* $169/toneddfp  . In addition, the DG quantity is
* 88,000toneddD   and the feed quantity is
* 220,000toneddfD  . 
With the lowest DG fraction 1f  , both producers have the maximum profit 
respectively and the quantity of feed is in the maximum since the feed price is the lowest. 
And more, the DG price is the lowest so that the quantity of DG as well as ethanol is the 
highest, which is helpful for the expanding ethanol market. Under the condition in Case 3, 
with the highest DG fraction, both producers have more profit and the E&DG producer 
produces the maximum quantity of ethanol. 
Since in Case 3 the increase of the DG fraction helps the expanding ethanol market and 
increases the profit of both producers. Next, we want to present the numerical solutions of 
both the ED model and the CC model in Case 3 with the other ingredients' cost $150/tonfc 
. 
5.2 Numerical solution of the ED model 
51/ 3, 180, 5 10 , 0.40,
$750/ton, $80/ton, $180/ton, $60/ton, $10/ton, $150/ton.
e d df df f
e em c dd fm f
k k
p c c c c c
       
     
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According to Eq. (2.47), this numerical example is in the Case 3 since 
f dc k  for
( ) 30em c dd d e ec c c k k p      and 50f dc k  .  
Figure 5.12 shows that the E&DG producer maximizes his profit by controlling the price 
of DG dp as Eq. (2.11), while he knows the best response function of the feed producer is
( )df dp p in Eq. (2.15). Therefore, the peak in Figure 5.12 is that the equilibrium
*ed
dp for DG 
is$145/ton  and *ed
E is$4,840,000 . 
 
Figure 5.12 The profit of the E&DG producer w.r.t. the price of DG in the ED model  
Similarly, Figure 5.13 shows that the feed producer in the ED model maximizes her own 
profit by controlling the price of feed
dfp as Eq. (11), while
* $145/toneddp  is given by the 
E&DG producer. Therefore, the peak in Figure 5.13 is that *ed
dfp  is $169/ton and 
*ed
F is
$2,420,000 . 
 
Figure 5.13 The profit of the feed producer w.r.t. the feed price in the ED model  
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Therefore, from Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13, the equilibrium prices in DG as well as 
feed are * *{ $145/ton, $169/ton}ed edd dfp p  . The quantity of feed is
* 220,000toneddfD 
according to the assumption A1. The profit of the E&DG producer is * $4,840,000edE  , 
and the profit of the feed producer is * $2,420,000edF   as shown in Figure 5.12 and Figure 
5.13. At the equilibrium point, the E&DG producer has twice more profit than the feed 
producer, * *2ed edE F   . 
5.3 Comparison among the ED model and the CC model  
Table 5.1 Numerical values of the ED model and the CC model  
 *
dfD
(ton) 
*
dD
(ton) 
*Q
(ton) 
 
*
eD
(ton) 
*
dfp
($/ton) 
*
dp
($/ton) 
*
E ($) 
*
F ($) 
*
CC
($) 
ED 220,000
 
88,000
 
264,000
 
88,000
 
169 145 4,840,000
 
2,420,000
 
7,260,000
 
CC  440,000
 
176,000 528,000
 
176,000
 
158 NA N/A N/A 9,680,000
 
In the CC model, the optimal feed price is * $158/tonccdfp  . When compared to the ED 
model, from Table 5.1, the CC model has the lower feed price along with the higher quantity 
of feed. In addition, the CC model has the quantity of corn, the quantity of DG and the 
quantity of ethanol twice more than the ED model. Therefore, more ethanol produced by the 
E&DG producer is provided for the expanding ethanol market. 
* *
* *
* *
* *
* *
$158/ton $169/ton
440,000ton 2
176,000ton 2
528,000ton 2
176,000ton 2
cc ed
df df
cc ed
df df
cc ed
d d
cc ed
cc ed
e e
p p
D D
D D
Q Q
D D
  
 
 
 
 
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By coordination, the total channel profit under the CC model is higher than the total 
profit in the ED model. Government might want to facilitate the sharing of the supply chain 
profit by subsidy, etc. to promote the higher production of ethanol. 
* * * * * * *$9,680,000 $7,260,000cc cc ed ed ed edCC E FTR TC TR TC         , since 
the increased total revenue is higher than the increased total cost when the CC model is 
compared to the ED model, where the total revenue in the CC model is higher than that in the 
ED model, 
* * 0cc edTR TR TR    , and the total cost in the CC model is higher than that in 
the ED model, 
* * 0cc edTC TC TC    , from Table 5.2.  
   
   
* * *
* * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
$201,520,000
$103,180,000
$191,840,000
$95,920,000
cc cc cc
e df
ed ed ed
e df
cc cc cc cc cc
em c d dd f df d db df
ed ed ed ed ed
em c d dd f df d db df
TR R R
TR R R
TC c c k c Q c D D c D
TC c c k c Q c D D c D
  
  
      
      
 
Thus, the total profit in the ED model is 3/4 of that in the CC model, 
 * * */ 0.75ed edE F CC    . 
Table 5.2 Revenues and costs in the ED model and the CC model 
 *
eR ($) 
*
dR ($)  
*
em c d ddc c k c Q 
($) 
*
dfR ($)  * *f df dc D D
($) 
*
fm dfc D
($) 
ED 66,000,000
 
12,760,000
 
73,920,000
 
37,180,000
 
19,800,000
 
2,200,000
 
CC 132,000,000
 
NA 147,840,000
 
69,520,000
 
39,600,000
 
4,400,000
 
Ratio 
b/w ED 
and CC  
0.50 NA 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.50 
Table 5.2 shows the revenues in selling ethanol, DG, and feed, respectively, and includes 
the costs for the E&DG production, other ingredients, and feed production, respectively.  
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Compared with the ED model, the CC model will gain more revenue in selling ethanol 
because more ethanol is produced, and gain more revenue in selling feed, although with a 
lower feed price. However, the CC model costs more for E&DG production, the other 
ingredients and the feed production with higher corresponding quantities. 
   
   
* *
* *
* *
* * * *
* *
$132,000,000 2
$69,520,000 2 $74,360,000
$147,840,000 2
$39,600,000 2
$4,400,000 2
cc ed
e e
cc ed
df df
cc ed
em c d dd em c d dd
cc cc ed ed
f df d f df d
cc ed
fm df fm df
R R
R R
c c k c Q c c k c Q
c D D c D D
c D c D
 
  
     
   
   
5.3.1 The analysis of supply chain models with respect to the DG fraction
f  
When there is the other ingredients' cost $150/tonfc  , as the DG fraction increases, the 
supply chain profit under both models increase, and the CC model has higher supply chain 
profit than the ED model from Figure 5.14. When given 0.40f  , the supply chain profit in 
the CC model is $9,680,000 and in the ED model is$7,260,000 . Moreover, usually the DG 
fraction for all kinds of animal has been ranged from 0 to 0.60. So, the CC model has the 
supply chain profit ranged in ($2,000,000,$15,680,000], and the ED model has the supply 
chain profit ranged in ($1,500,000,$11,760,000].  
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Figure 5.14 The analysis of the supply chain profit w.r.t the DG fraction 
In this numerical example with 0.40f  , the quantity of corn used for the production 
under both models is 
* 528,000tonccQ  and * 264,000tonedQ  , respectively. Thus, Figure 
5.15 shows the quantity of corn under both models. When the DG fraction for all kinds of 
animal has been ranged from 0 to 0.60, the quantity of corn is ranged in (0ton,1,008,000ton]
in the CC model and in (0ton,504,000ton] in the ED model. According to the assumption A3 
and Eq. (2.2), in the CC model, the quantity of DG as well as ethanol is ranged in 
(0ton,168,000ton] , and the feed quantity is ranged in (100,000ton,280,000ton]. 
 
Figure 5.15 The analysis of the quantity of corn w.r.t the DG fraction 
5.4 Numerical solution of the EDQ model  
In summary, the parameters in the numerical example are: 
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5 91/ 3, 180, 5 10 , 320, 2 10 , 0.40,
$750/ton, $180/ton, $60/ton, $10/ton, $150/ton.
e d df df f
e c dd fm f
k k
p c c c c
             
    
 
5.4.1 The unit and total joint production cost in the EDQ model 
Hence, from Eq. (4.1)
 
in the EDQ model we have a function to express the total joint 
production cost of the E&DG producer with regard to the quantity of corn used for the 
production in (5.1). 
 
2 3 4 2 9 3ˆ 3 320 8 3 10 2 10EMC (Q) Q Q Q Q Q Q  
            (5.1) 
The E&DG producer has the unit joint production cost as Figure 5.16 and the total joint 
production cost as Figure 5.17. The unit joint production cost is a quadratic function with 
regard to the quantity of con used for the production; the total joint production cost is a 
monotonic increasing function as the increase of the quantity of con used for the production. 
 
Figure 5.16 The unit joint production cost of the E&DG producer 
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Figure 5.17 The total joint production cost of the E&DG producer 
5.4.2 Numerical example 
This numerical example satisfies 2 0    in Eq. (4.12) and 2 0   in Eq. (4.13), 
so we have the equilibrium solution listed in Table 4.1. The numerical values of each 
variables in the EDQ model are listed in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Numerical values of the ED model and the EDQ model 
 *dfD
(ton) 
*
dD
(ton) 
*Q
(ton) 
*
eD
(ton) 
*
dfp
($/ton) 
*
dp
($/ton) 
*
E ($) 
*
F ($) 
*
CC ($) 
ED 220,000
 
88,000
 
264,000
 
88,000
 
169 145 4,840,000
 
2,420,000
 
7,260,000
 
EDQ 282,222 112,889 338,666 112,889 166 130 4,412,230 3,982,460 8,394,690 
From Table 5.3, compared to the EDQ model, the ED model has the lower quantity in 
feed, DG, corn, as well as ethanol, has the higher price in feed as well as DG, and has the 
higher profit for the E&DG producer, the lower profit for the feed producer, and the lower 
profit for the total profit of the supply chain.  
Figure 5.18 presents the total joint production cost of the E&DG producer under the ED 
model as well the EDQ model. Since / 4 80emc   , Figure 5.18 is in the situation 1. 
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Figure 5.18 The total joint production cost of the E&DG producer in the ED & EDQ models 
   
* 7
2 3
* * * * 7
$2.112 10
ˆ 3 $2.71339 10
ed
em
edq edq edq edq
EM
c Q
C (Q ) Q Q Q  
 
      
The EDQ model spends more joint production cost than the ED model from
* *ˆed edq
em EMc Q C (Q ) . 
 
Figure 5.19 The profit of the feed producer in the ED model as well as the EDQ model  
Figure 5.20 shows that the E&DG producer maximizes his profit by controlling dp as Eq. 
(2.11) in the ED model and Eq.(4.8) in the EDQ model, while he knows the best response 
function for the feed producer is ( )df dp p in Eqs. (2.15) and (4.5). Therefore, the equilibrium
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*ed
dp in the ED model is $145/ton and 
*ed
E is$4,840,000 , and the equilibrium
*edq
dp in the 
ED model is$130/ton and *edq
E is$4,412,230 .  
 
Figure 5.20 The profit of the E&DG producer in the ED model as well as the EDQ model 
Similarly, Figure 5.20 shows that, the feed producer in the ED model maximizes her 
own profit by controlling
dfp as Eq. (2.12) in the ED model and Eq.(4.4) in the EDQ model, 
while * $145/toneddp   and
* $130/tonedqdp   are given by the E&DG producer. Therefore, 
*ed
dfp  is $169/ton and 
*ed
F is $2,420,000 , and the equilibrium
*edq
dfp in the ED model is
$166/ton and *edq
F is$3,982,460 . 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK 
Many studies about the competitive or coordination relationship between two successive 
producers only study for one final product. Instead, our paper extends to study the 
Stackelberg competition between two successive producers: the E&DG producer as the 
Stackelberg leader produces two joint output products (ethanol and DG), and the feed 
producer as the Stackelberg follower utilizes DG for feed production. Then the equilibrium 
consequences are explored in terms of profits, prices, and demands, which shows the E&DG 
producer gains more profit than the feed producer does. After analyzing with respect to 
parameters from the feed producer, i.e., the DG fraction, the cost of other ingredients, the 
E&DG producer has more sensitive profit to the change in these parameters than the feed 
producer does. When other ingredients‟ cost increases, the profit of both producers will lose 
profit and the quantity of DG as well as ethanol decreases, since the increasing cost to 
produce feed results in the increase of the feed price. However, the increase of the DG 
fraction under specific cases helps to increase the quantity of DG as well as ethanol in order 
to help the expanding ethanol market. 
Being a group, the CC model is the coordination scenario to compare the Stackelberg 
model with respect to the supply chain profit and the performance. Compared with the 
Stackelberg model, the centrally coordinated model has higher total profit to be shared by 
both producers, and has higher quantity of ethanol provided to the quick expanding ethanol 
market.  
In the part of work in progress, 1) the supply chain with a revenue sharing contract is 
introduced for the higher coordinated profit. 2) the supply of DG from the E&DG is greater 
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than its demand from the feed producer, and the surplus of DG is costly disposed of. And the 
E&DG producer has the capacity constraint for his production. With these constraints, we 
explored under what condition for the cost of discarding, the E&DG producer would not like 
to discard. 
The analysis presented in this paper leads to several interesting areas for further 
research:  1) When most of other ingredient in feed is corn, what is the impact of the DG 
fraction when the corn price is changing. 2) The effort of the feed producer to consume more 
DG is taken into account. /f d ca b p c    , the DG fraction in feed is the down slope 
function with regard to the ratio between the DG price and the corn price [56]. Under a 
certain condition, the incentive will lose effectiveness, and the E&DG producer will reject it. 
3) When the surplus of DG occurs, the E&DG producer will select the quantity discount to 
sell them. Then, we can study how the quantity discount strategy is applied in the supply 
chain.  
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